Knowledge, simplicity, and predication: essays on Plato's _Theaetetus_ by Meyvis, Nathan
Knowledge, simplicity, and predication: essays on
Plato's Theaetetus
Nate Meyvis
May 2017
c2017 Nate Meyvis
1
KNOWLEDGE, SIMPLICITY, AND PREDICATION: ESSAYS ON
PLATO'S THEAETETUS
Nate Meyvis, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2017
The end of the Theaetetus, including Socrates' \Dream" and his three propos-
als about logos, raises a variety of epistemological and metaphysical problems.
These essays attempt to illuminate some of them. In the rst essay, I discuss the
three logos-proposals and argue that Socrates' discussion here is, in a certain
sense, epistemological and not metaphysical. In the second essay, I argue that
the Platonic notion of uniformity (which appears in the Dream) has not been
properly appreciated, and I oer a candidate interpretation. In the third essay,
I argue that the distinction between being and becoming in the Dream, and
elsewhere in Plato, should be understood as a dierence in kinds of predication.
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Chapter 1
Notes on the three
logos-proposals that end
the Theaetetus
1.1 Introduction
The Theaetetus ends with Socrates discussing three proposals for a denition
of logos. These proposals are parts of a larger treatment of knowledge as true
judgment with an account (logos). Socrates rejects each of the three proposals,
and the dialogue ends aporetically.
Commentators have discussed Socrates' reasons for dismissing each of these
proposals, whether these dismissals are justied or not, and what to make
of Socrates' or Plato's commitment to the knowledge-as-true-judgment-with-a-
logos schema in light of Socrates' arguments. Some commentators make much
of the fact that the rejections create an aporia, and others do not. Both empha-
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sizing and de-emphasizing the state of aporia have been done with a variety of
motivations.
Among de-emphasizers, some seem motivated by a kind of skepticism that
the order and progression of Socrates' various arguments is of much signicance.1
Others take Plato to be leading us to the conclusion that, because Socrates has
invoked some premise that he (Plato) does not believe and that we do not need
to accept, we can retain the true-judgment-with-logos schema but with a view
of logoi other than the three that are explicitly considered.2
Among the aporia emphasizers, some take the lesson to be that we need to
supply a metaphysics of Forms roughly as we nd them in the Republic.3 Others
take the important eect of the aporia to be a sort of tribute to the gure of
Socrates and a call to do philosophy in the Socratic style.4 And others have
suggested yet more reasons.
I will hold that a partial explanation of this aporia can be supplied in light of
careful consideration of the three logos-proposals. According to the view I will
argue for, Socrates' rejections of each of the three logos-proposals get their force
not because the logoi under consideration fail to accurately reect the world,
but rather because combinations of such logoi with true judgment could not be
knowledge. Moreover, these deciences are not ukes or idiosyncratic features
of the three proposals; each of Socrates' arguments against the proposals applies
to very many candidate logoi, and perhaps all reasonable logoi. This motivates
1John McDowell, for example, has suggested that we concern ourselves most with \for-
mal incompatibility" or the lack thereof between adjacent passages rather than worry-
ing too much about whether considerations suggested by one passage are in tension with
another.[McDowell, 1973, p. 239] He has also at least occasionally taken a skeptical attitude
toward the unity and cohesion of the Theaetetus, as when he begins a discussion of the Dream
by noting that its \signicance, if any ... is not clear."[McDowell, 1973, p. 231]
2Gail Fine, for example, has held that the evidence in the dialogue tells in favor of constru-
ing knowledge as justied true belief (see [Fine, 1979, p. 369]) and more generally arms a
\interrelation model" of knowledge (see [Fine, 1979], especially pgs. 394-5 for the relationship
between the dialogue's aporia and its epistemological suggestions).
3See [Cornford, 1935].
4See [Sedley, 2004, p. 9].
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the aporia as arising from the existence of a problematic assumption driving the
inquiry at the end of the dialogue; as long as the interlocutors hold on to the view
of knowledge as true judgment with a logos, the candidate knowledge-proposals
are bound to fail.
This way of motivating the aporia has at least two important consequences.
First, it suggests a path to the familiar but disputed conclusion that the end of
the Theaetetus invites the reader to reject not some theory of logoi but rather
the whole project of treating knowledge as true judgment with a logos. The three
accounts of logos are in many ways quite respectable: Socrates presents them
as such, and if the intended audience of the Theaetetus includes sympathetic
readers of other late-Platonic dialogues, that audience would likely be inclined to
agree with Socrates that the accounts are respectable. Yet they cannot generate
an acceptable account of knowledge, if knowledge is true judgment with a logos.
The reader, therefore, might reasonably be expected to conclude that Socrates'
materials are worthy but his blueprint is not, and that it is the blueprint{the
view that knowledge is true judgment with a logos{that should be discarded.
Second, it suggests a dierence between this last section of the dialogue and
the immediately preceding section, the mereology of Theaetetus 204-5. This
previous section is explicitly about the structure of items such as wagons and
armies; insofar as it discusses logoi of those items, those logoi are to be judged
in terms of their adequacy at describing the structure of such items. Thus the
two adjacent sections have at least this important dierence in their aims.
I describe these two consequences in section 5; sections 2 through 4 take up
each of Socrates' three proposals in turn.
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1.2 The stream-of-speech view
Socrates' rst proposal is that to give a logos of something, and so (perhaps) to
provide whatever turns a true belief into knowledge, is to make one's thought
clear in speech, as though the judgment were imprinted5 in a verbal stream
the way that it might be imprinted in a mirror or in water.6 One immediately
suspects that this proposal will not be satisfactory, and of Socrates' rejections
of the three proposals, this one holds the fewest surprises for the modern reader.
Socrates points out that anyone who has true judgment will be able to per-
form the described imprinting,7 so that (on this view) the additional requirement
of the logos adds nothing to the view, already rejected, that knowledge is true
judgment.8
This is enough to refute this rst logos-proposal, but Socrates' remarks con-
tain enough material for other objections. He notes that such logoi will be
available to anyone who is neither deaf nor dumb.9 If knowledge is to be a sig-
nicant achievement, and if logos-having is a condition on knowledge, then the
stream-of-speech view must fail; Socrates has plausibly suggested that forming
a true judgment into speech does not require the right sort of understanding
5ektupoumenon, 206d4. We might characterize the rst proposal as \simply `speech'," as
Lee does ([Lee, 1998, p. 428]; see also \voicing a true judgment" at [Gill, 2012, p. 127].
However, note that the passage and this verb suggest that there is something important not
just about performing speech-acts per se, but rather about xing or translating a certain kind
of thought in a certain activity or medium.
6206d1-5.
7One might hold instead that the imprinting is something that one passively receives, so
that the characterization I give is infelicitous. I choose the active characterization because it
is suggested by the language Socrates uses: the imprinting is an elaboration of \making one's
thought clear" (to te^n autou dianoian emphane^ poiein, 206d1-2). As the latter seems to be
something that the knowing agent does, so presumably is the imprinting.
8Here it might be suggested that while knowledge is not true judgment, anyone who has
knowledge also has true judgment. In this way, one could hold that the rejection of the
knowledge-is-true-judgment claim does not rule out the stream-of-speech view or some other
view according to which anyone who has true judgment has knowledge. It is clear in (e.g.)
the example of the jury, (at 201a .) however, that the rejection of the claim that knowledge
is true judgment rests at least in part on the fact that one can have one without the other.
As such, they rule out views according to which, although the two states are dierent, true
judgment always puts one in a position to have knowledge.
9206d9
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beyond what is required to get the true judgment in the rst place.
There remains the question why Plato thought to include this theory of
logos. This cannot be answered with anything we nd explicitly in the text, but
one might wonder whether it is a brief treatment of popular methods of debate,
and more generally of the view that one establishes one's expertise by making
speeches. (Recall Meno's surprise at the realization that all his public speeches
about virtue might not prove that he really knows his subject.10) We might, by
contrast, read this rst proposal, which is discussed only briey, as a claim that
some widespread standards of knowledge-attribution are badly mistaken.11
Note that the content of what is imprinted on the stream of speech does not
gure in Socrates' rejection of the view. One might have a quite perfect grasp of
an item or be reciting one of the denitions that Socrates applauds in the early
and middle dialogues. Even in this case, Socrates' comments will still strongly
support the view that imprinting one's thoughts in speech still does not count
as giving a logos in a way having knowledge requires. Rather than rejecting a
view about the sort of thought or state that puts one in a suciently strong
epistemic position, Socrates has rejected a view that seems to apply no matter
what the content of the logos is.12 We will nd that this is not unique to the
rst of the three logos-proposals.
1.3 The down-to-the-elements view
The second proposal has become known as the \enumeration of elements"
view.13 This label is in some respects unfortunate, as it might encourage mis-
10Meno 80a-b.
11Tad Brennan notes that the third logos-denition can be viewed as a renement of this
one: here we consider a logos that is whatever anyone would say, whereas later we will consider
what most people will say.
12One might hold that only some sorts of logoi put one in a position to put them in speech
in the right way. There is no such suggestion at 206d, however.
13See, e.g., [Lee, 1998, p. 428]; [Taylor, 1998, p. 186]; [Bostock, 1988, p. 222]; [Fine, 1977];
[McDowell, 1973, p. 252]; [Thomas, 2002, p. 55]. [Runciman, 1962, p. 40] has \enumeration
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taken readings of what elements are and of what Socrates means when he speaks
of giving an account by nishing an answer with the elements.
Socrates repeatedly speaks of answering dia (\through") \the elements."14
Sometimes he speaks of perainein (roughly, \going through") an answer, some-
times of making a hodos dia (\path through") elements. To claim that to do
this is to enumerate elements is a leap: Socrates does not use language narrowly
tailored to doing such a thing, when Plato might easily have made him do so.
(Note that Socrates, at 146e, was happy to correct Theaetetus for \counting up"
(arithme^sai) instances of knowledge rather than telling Socrates what knowl-
edge itself is; Plato was perfectly happy to use arithmeo^ when appropriate.)
The parts being listed are not described as arithmoi in this passage, and the
process of listing them is not described with any verb related to arithmos.15
At least two things might be meant by `enumeration,' and they might be
described as `ordered lists' and `unordered lists' (to borrow phrases from com-
puter science). An unordered list is, roughly, a collection of items to which are
attributed no structure whatsoever other than membership in the collection; an
ordered list has whatever structure is required to support the items' having a
dened order. Commentators seem to have the former in mind, especially when
they claim that this notion of logos has no resources with which to account for
structure.16
There is strong evidence, by contrast, that the examples suggest that the
of all the parts." Gill avoids the phrase; see [Gill, 2012, p. 128]; Shields ([Shields, 1999]) avoids
it also.
14206e, 207e, 208a, 208b.
15Socrates uses forms of \arithmeo^" at 146e and 198c, but nowhere else in the dialogue.
Another term Socrates might have used for an enumerated list is \katalogos." Indeed, Socrates
does use this word in the Theaetetus, at 175a, where it means something like \list of ancestors."
Thus Plato is withholding from Socrates a vocabulary of enumeration that is very much
available to him. (These facts about the text were conrmed with a manual search combined
with a search of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.)
16See, e.g., [Lee, 1998, p. 429]; [Bostock, 1988, p. 225]. Fine considers the structure of the
argument in the cases both when the enumerations do are and are not ordered ([Fine, 1979,
p. 382]). She argues that the enumerations of elements are not ordered ([Fine, 1979, pgs.
383-4]); I argue against that claim below.
14
items in the list (or the logos-as-list) are importantly ordered. The discussion is
animated by the example of letters and words, and neither of the interlocutors
suggests that the existence of anagrams17 defeats the view (as they would if
these logoi were unordered lists); thus we have some reason to think that these
lists (if they are in fact lists) are ordered.
It is surely correct to note, as Fine does, that \neither Socrates nor the dream
theorist ever explicitly appeals to order in elucidating the dream theory."18
She notes that the letter-examples suggest that order is somehow relevant, but
concludes that the examples taken as a whole suggest a picture in which order is
not relevant. Fine claims that \axle, yoke, wheels" is as appropriate a logos as
\wheels, axle, yoke," and it is clear why one would think this, but it is less clear
that a full elemental logos would be similarly immune from reordering. The
wheels are, after all, connected to the axle in a way that they are not connected
to the yoke, and this fact is reected in the latter logos but not the former.
Very often, order determines so much about structure that we use the former to
track, communicate, and reason about the latter.19 It is relevant that Socrates'
ve-element account{he also mentions the body and the rail{is explicitly marked
as decient and to be dispreferred to a Hesiodic \hundred timbers" account.20
The language of the passage might add further support for the view that
elemental logoi are essentially ordered or structured: again, Socrates speaks
of making a dia tou stoikheiou hodon (a road or path through the elements)
17By `anagram' I mean `a word using the same letters [as another],' with the notions of `us-
ing' and `letter' dened contextually; if `letters' here are fundamentally verbal or spoken, then
the denition of an anagram here would slightly dierent from the usual (written) denition.
On the grammata as fundamentally verbalized entities in the late Plato, see [Menn, 1998, p.
292].
18[Fine, 1979, p. 383]
19I give examples on p. 8 below.
20Here I disagree with, among others, Rorty ([Rorty, 1972, p. 12]), who follows Morrow in
suggesting that the wagon example should lead us to believe that stoikheia are what they are
in virtue of their incorporation in the whole (as a bit of wood is not a spoke except insofar
as it is a wagon-part). Whether or not that is a correct claim about spokes, it cannot be the
case that to doru (the splinter) is only to doru in wagon-context, and Socrates prefers the
Hesiodic logos: hekaton de te dourath' hamaxes.
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at 208b4-5; paths are directional, and one does not have the same path if one
scrambles the order in which it passes by various landmarks.
If elemental logoi are indeed ordered, then the oft-repeated comment that
logoi reect nothing of an item's structure is not correct, as order reects at
least some nontrivial part of a thing's structure, even if we ultimately would not
believe that a well-ordered list of an item's ingredients is a full-blooded logos.21
Another important and often-overlooked feature of the elemental logoi un-
der discussion is that Socrates does not present any bona de non-linguistic
examples of them.22 When Socrates gives a logos of a wagon, for example,
he{by his own lights{is not giving a proper logos of a wagon at all, only a de-
cient placeholder-logos. When we imagine lling in Socrates' ve-element wagon
account more fully, the further parts we would add might include small parts
involved in the connection of the wheels to the axle, parts that connect the body
to the wheels-axle combination, and so on. We do not need to insist that such
a logos would survive the strictest possible scrutiny to see at least the initial
plausibility of such an account. Instructions for assembling furniture occasion-
ally just provide a list of pictures of parts: everything else, including how the
parts t together, is meant to be obvious once you see the pictures in that order.
Genes are often characterized by listing certain kinds of parts (exons, introns,
promoters, repressors, and so on) in a certain order, or by giving a long list of its
nucleotides. The structure and function of a gene is often very complicated, but
the complicated aspects are entailed by this order and by virtue of the identities
21Haring ([Haring, 1982]) takes an opposite approach: he denies that elemental logoi must
be `inventories' and claims that they can be any sort of expert discourse on an item, and
such expert descriptions must involve parts ([Haring, 1982, p. 520]). I do not think this view
can be squared with the examples in this section the text, all of which are not just expert
descriptions, or gestures toward expert descriptions, but expert descriptions in terms of lists
of parts.
22One might think that the logoi of \THEODORUS" and \THEAETETUS" are `full-
blooded' logoi or that they are meant merely suggestively. Here I remain agnostic about
this. If they are not full-blooded logoi, the ensuing discussion follows without alteration. If
they are, this is even more support for the view that order `counts' in an elemental logos; see
p. 6 above.
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of those ordered parts (that something is a repressor and not any old sequence
entails something about the functioning of the gene). In this way, an elemental
logos of a gene might be thought to have prima facie plausibility.23
Elsewhere in the late dialogues, we explicitly encounter the idea that mas-
tering elements so as to be able to give correct accounts of complexes in terms
of elements is a high achievement. The parable of Theuth in the Philebus24 is
one in which Theuth has a sort of legendary status for having laid the ground-
work for such analyses to be possible in the case of language. Moreover, the
example of the education in grammar at Statesman 277e . also suggests that
lots of education is required not to be \swept away by everything"25 in a state
of confusion about letters and syllables.26
Socrates objects to this second candidate view of logos by noting that having
a such logoi seems, upon reection, insucient for knowledge. One could give
the correct logos of something in terms of its elements and yet be disposed
to fail to apply those elements correctly in some other logos in which they
properly appear.27 In Socrates' example, one could correctly give the logos of
23The function and structure of genes is more complicated than this; a better account might
be a Hesiodic \three billion nucleotides." Moreover, there is disagreement about whether
`gene' is a well-dened term as standardly understood. We do not yet fully understand the
structure and function of a gene, in the general case. Despite that, genes as they are commonly
understood are relatively plausible candidates for elemental logoi.
24Philebus 18b .
25peri hapanta ... pheretai, 278d.
26For more on the magnitude of Theuth's achievement and the diculty of analyzing lan-
guage into stoikheia, see [Menn, 1998, p. 289-9]; the discussion there is in terms of division
and not immediately in terms of logos-giving, but it applies to analyses `down to the elements'
in the case of language. See also Phaedrus 266b.
27This way of characterizing Socrates' objection to the second logos-view might surprise us
in the following way: One might paraphrase the central claim of this essay as an assertion
that Socrates' objections collectively point us beyond the view that having a certain kind of
content in mind is sucient for knowledge. The move to considering dispositions might seem
to be a reasonable reaction to to this observation, but not part of it.
There can be no doubt that some sort of dispositional considerations are part of Socrates'
rejection of the second logos-view; he explicitly evokes them in his remarks at 207e7-208a3.
This is, however, compatible with my view that Socrates' objections are in fact unied by the
thought that having a certain kind of content in mind does not entail that one has knowledge-
attribution. Rather, it appears that Socrates takes some preliminary steps toward identifying
what precisely is wrong with a state of mind that we might characterize as one in which one
simply has the right logos.
We might think that Socrates' consideration of dispositions is a promising line of thought,
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\Theaetetus" but fail to give the \The" correctly in the logos of \Theodorus."
In such a case, Socrates plausibly thinks, one does not really know the logos of
\Theaetetus."28
The fact that Socrates in fact considers himself unable to give examples
of elemental logoi more dicult than spelling examples, combined with the
features of his explicit objection to that view, emphasizes aspects of Socrates'
objection that might surprise us. The objection raises a general problem of
logos-giving that has almost nothing to do with the adequacy or inadequacy of
element-accounts in correctly characterizing an item.
The problem, that is, is not with the relationship between the logos and
the item but rather with that between the logos and the (potential) knower.29
Someone might give a logos of an item's elements that is true of the item, but
the giver's relationship to the parts of the logos might be accidental, in the
following sense of `accidental:' the ability to correctly name that part in the
and thereby wonder why he does not make more of them, perhaps by suggesting that the
disposition to apply a logos correctly is sucient for knowledge. (The most he suggests is
that knowledge manifests itself with the right kind of dispositional mastery of elements.)
As contemporary epistemology teaches us, however, it is dicult or impossible for such an
appeal to dispositions to secure a satisfying account of knowledge. After considering examples
of \blindsighters," chicken sexers, and those who simply get very lucky, most of us come to
think that even if knowledge manifests itself in the disposition to give the right answers, the
disposition itself is not all of what is needed. One simple way to summarize this lesson is that
it is hard for a bare appeal to a disposition to help us pick out a mental state that is not
just another sort of \mere having" of (what we would call) some content. Thus we might be
satised that Socrates uses the disposition to apply logos-parts correctly as a necessary, not
a sucient, condition on knowledge.
28There is a small translational issue here. At 208a9 Socrates says about the true judger
of \Theaetetus" that he has the path dia stoikheiou. In Burnyeat/Levett this is rendered
as \through its letters," but I prefer McDowell's \element by element"{it is clear that a let-
ter, in the sense of an ultimate grammatical element, is such a thing as B or S (see Theaet.
203b). In the example, though, the logos-giver is producing and misapplying elements such
as \THE," which is a multi-letter complex. It is not obvious why Plato chose such an ex-
ample, but note that this generates an analogy with the wagon example. The ve-element
account might be thought to stand to the \hundred timbers" account as the syllabic account
of \THEAETETUS" stands to an account in terms of letters. Whether or not one thinks this
is a signicant feature of these examples, I would prefer not to implicitly characterize \THE"
as a letter when it is functioning as a more general kind of stoikheion; for this reason, I prefer
McDowell's rendering.
29This entails, among other things, that Runciman is not correct to characterize Socrates'
objection as turning on the fact that the view of logos \assumes a complexity of the object
concerned;" see [Runciman, 1962, p. 40].
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logos at hand might accompany a decient grasp of that part more generally.
The candidate knower might not be disposed to name that part correctly in all
and only the logoi to which it belongs.
This is a problem for the down-to-the-elements view of logoi, but it is also a
problem for other logos-candidates, all of which involve constituents, and all of
which will face the problem that the ability to cite correct constituents in one
case might not track the ability to cite those constituents correctly, everywhere
and always. Suppose, for example, that justice is psychic harmony, and that
I am inclined to produce that denition if it is asked of me. Whatever the
justication for this denition, and however we characterize the roles of psychic
and harmony in the denition (that is, whether or not they are elements of
justice as elements are characterized in the Theaetetus), one could raise the
question whether I understand those two items suciently well to really know
justice (as opposed to merely being able to produce the correct logos of it).
The problem generalizes even farther, because the issue of constituents, and
of analyzing an item into its constituents, is not essential to at least one aspect
of Socrates' objection: The one-time ability, or even the propensity, to give a
certain logos does not entail a full, correct grasp of that logos. The specic prob-
lem case Socrates discusses is that of someone's correctly giving \Theaetetus"
but mistakenly giving \Teodorus" for \Theodorus," and this mistake does have
something to do with these words' having parts. Closely related mistakes, how-
ever, do not require that the denitions in question have parts. Suppose that we
had some secure argument to the eect that some item's logos was some simple,
monadic item{call it X. It is true that if an item does not have proper parts,
one could not manifest an insecure knowledge of its logos by being disposed to
mis-recognize or fail to recognize one of its proper parts in other circumstances.
Even so, one could nonetheless fail properly to understand X correctly in other
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circumstances, either by not always giving X as the logos of the item in question
or by giving X as the logos of some other item, but mistakenly.
Perhaps there are no monadic logoi, and indeed much of the Dream presup-
poses that logoi are, at least in the general case, complex. Even so, Socrates'
objection to the elemental theory of logoi is driven by a specically epistemic
sort of concern, which does not entail that logoi `down to the elements' fail at
the job of characterizing things in the world; the objection is robust to extreme
variations in what such a correct characterization would be.
1.4 The distinguishing mark
Socrates introduces the last of the three logos-proposals by noting that it is
what most people would say about logoi. The proposal is that something's
logos is some sign (ti se^meion) by which it diers from everything else{e.g.,
something's being the brightest star in the sky, or something's being the answer
that most people would give. (So, if this is the correct view of logos, Socrates
has begun his exposition of it by giving a logos of logos, because being what
most people would say would, as a unique sign, on this view count as a logos.)
The discussion of this third proposal is like the discussion of the second proposal
in that contemporary analytic philosophers are likely to reject the theory along
with Socrates, but they are also likely to be surprised by the path by which
Socrates chooses to attack it.
We might expect Socrates to reject the view because that sign or dierence
is a mere feature of the thing, not what it is to be that thing. Socrates, though
doubtless able to refute the theory on the grounds that it does not accurately
reect the being of the item, surprises us by raising a dierent problem: if we
are thinking a logos and a true judgment, with logos construed in accordance
with this third view (as giving a distinguishing mark of the item), it is dicult
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to maintain the view that we are thinking about the putatively known thing.30
In making this claim, Socrates attempts to turn what we might have thought
would be a strength of the theory into a deciency. It is natural to think that
if one is giving a distinctive se^meion of an item, then{whatever else might be
wrong with one's epistemic state at that time{one is at least, when one is giving
the se^meion, already addressing that item.31 Socrates, however, makes prob-
lems even for this initial conclusion. That thought or description involving the
se^meion arguably does not suce to guarantee that one is addressing that item,
because it has a component or precondition{the true judgment{that, according
to Socrates' line of reasoning, cannot be said to be about the item.
By so undermining the theory, Socrates refutes before we can even explicitly
ask the (supposedly) harder questions of it (e.g.: why is logos with a unique
se^meion of something sucient not only for true judgment but for knowledge?).
30Gail Fine reminds me that one might hold that Socrates here retains the structure of
the account but also imposes a requirement that the dierence \specify the essence" of the
item. (For a suggestion along these lines, see [Fine, 1979, p. 392, n. 28].) The way Socrates
nishes his discussion of the third logos-proposal might be thought to tell against this proposal,
however. At 210a, Socrates suggests that any dierence-adding proposal amounts to a view
according to which knowledge is correct judgment along with knowledge, and that this is
`foolish' (eue^thes, 210a7). There is no suggestion that this foolishness would be mitigated by
one's having a certain sort of dierence, even a dierence that species an essence, in mind.
31Lee ([Lee, 1998, p. 431]) holds that this argument establishes what Socrates' examples
suggest: that this view of logos is conned to \individual objects." On her view, \if one gives
up the assumption that the objects of knowledge are unique individual objects, there is no
reason to think that one would be capable of giving a se^meion if one had a true judgment
about a kind of thing." It is not clear, however, why Socrates' argument should not go through
mutatis mutandis even in the case of kinds, universals, or other non-\individual" items. If
one really is thinking of zebras and not of giraes or okapis, it is plausible that something
specically about zebras, and not about giraes or okapis, bears some sort of relationship to
your thought.
One might resist this objection for at least two reasons: rst, because \some sort of rela-
tionship" might not put one in a position to give the zebra-specic se^meion; second, because
the reference of \zebra" might be xed by a community or by appropriate experts within it
(see [Burge, 1982]). Note, however, that each of these paths of resistance also applies to the
case of \individual objects." Theaetetus's unique features might indeed cause my thought
to be about Theaetetus instead of about Theodorus without my being able to accurately
describe those features; some sort of community- or expert-centric view of naming might be
what causes our thoughts about (the historical) Theaetetus to be about Theaetetus instead
of Theodorus. While the kind/non-kind distinction might be relevant to the plausibility of
such accounts (see, again, [Burge, 1982]), there is certainly no immediate or obvious reason
why Socrates' arguments here should not apply in domains broader than that of items like
Theaetetus or the sun.
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The problem, again, is that it is not only the logos but also the true judgment
that must be about the object (or so Socrates plausibly implies). If it is the
logos that contributes the unique factor, then we should wonder why the true
judgment, which supposedly required supplementation by that logos, was true
judgment of that item in the rst place. Either the logos and only the logos is
about the object, in which case the true judgment seems inert with respect to
the knower's epistemic success; or it is not, and the true judgment itself already
somehow uniquely involves its object, in which case the logos, in its role as
delineating a unique feature, in fact adds nothing at all.
The example driving this section is that of Theaetetus' snub nose; once
readers have confronted the question how features common to all humans could
possibly cause one to think of Theaetetus, they must then wonder why thinking
of his snub nose would cause one to think of him and not of Socrates.
This example has at least two important consequences on this theory of
logos. First, it suggests a shift from (what we would think of as) unique de-
scriptions of a thing to unique traces or memories of it, at least as a matter of
imagery. Whereas an early example of a unique sign was the sun's being the
brightest item in the sky, the current example is that of a snub-nosedness be-
ing \impressed upon him" (par' emoi ense^me^namene^, 209c8).32 The former is
32Christine Thomas is one commentator who suggests that the example of the snubness is
readily interpreted along the lines of a unique description, not along the line of a trace or
memory. She holds that `this' and `that' in this account of logos function as demonstratives
in such phrases as `this snubness' and `that cactus.'[Thomas, 2002, p. 66 .].
Thomas's view is more mysterious than it might rst appear, however. Her notion of a
demonstrative is neither that of contemporary philosophers nor one that is easily found in
Plato. Specically, it cannot be a close relative of a Russellian view according to which such
terms function as `logically proper names.' This is because Thomas holds that looking at a
cactus and thinking `that,' or saying `that' while attempting to refer to the cactus, does not
establish that the reference of your thought or speech is the cactus, as opposed to the book
next to the cactus. To establish such reference, one has to add a sortal such as `cactus' and
say something like `this cactus' or `that cactus.'[Thomas, 2002, p. 67]. Perhaps this is a true
claim about the prerequisites for successful reference to objects using `this' and `that,' but
even if it is, it shows that `that' is not a logically proper name. Suppose that the cactus were
named `Fred;' we would think it strange if someone claimed that thinking or saying `Fred' is
insucient to establish the cactus, as opposed to the book next to the cactus, as the referent
of the thought or speech. If this were a true view of `Fred'-thoughts and `Fred'-speech-acts,
it would show that names do not function as we think they do, and certainly not as logically
22
naturally understood as an irreducibly linguistic description of something (the
sun), whereas the latter is naturally understood as a non-linguistic mental item
to which another item could be compared. Socrates' discussion eventually re-
calls the wax tablet example33 and its question of how to compare subsequent
thoughts about an item with that item's previous eects on one's soul.
Second, the example suggests that, when a given term appears in one's
thought, the referent of that term, or at least what that term evokes, is an
extreme or characteristic example of that term. The text suggests explicitly
that thinking about a face in general (even in combination with other items
such as a leg and an arm) does not x one's thought on Theaetetus. We may
ask: given that this is true, what does that thought x one's mind on? One kind
of answer is that one is not thinking about anything in having that thought.
If that is not plausible, however, there are again two alternatives that t the
spirit of the text's suggestion that the object of the thought cannot be anything
that requires us to distinguish between dierent items that the term correctly
describes. On the rst alternative, we would be thinking of anything with a face
(so some combination or disjunction of Theaetetus, the \remotest Mysian" of
209b8, and all other face-having things).
On the second alternative, however, we would say that what the term `face'
properly applies to is, simply, face-ness or a Form of face. Such a suggestion is
arguably found in other Platonic texts. Republic 515b2, for example, is naturally
taken as a Socratic suggestion that terms do not refer to shadows on the wall
proper names.
Moreover, Thomas's view faces a textual problem. She suggests that one of the koina must
be added to `this' or `that' in order to secure reference to an item.[Thomas, 2002, p. 67] Yet,
in the discussion of perception at 184-186, the koina include such items as being and sameness
(see [Thomas, 2002, p. 57]), which do not correspond to sortal terms like `cactus' or `book.'
Thus not all koina avoid the problem of being applicable to anything, and it is not one of
the koina, qua being one of the koina, that will solve the problem. As the very term koina
suggests, the function of such terms seems not to be to identify some terms as opposed to all
others.
33In this I concur with [Gill, 2012, p. 129]; as she notes, the term se^meion is used several
times from 191d to 194d.
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of the cave but to entities outside the cave (which, again arguably, stand in
for Forms). Moreover, the Phaedo 78d suggestion that the many beautifuls and
many equals are homonymous with things in themselves has often been taken as
a suggestion that the `realities'{that is, the Forms{bear names primarily, while
the perceptible particulars bear those names only derivatively and deciently,
hence Plato's tendency to use the term epo^numia, `naming after,' and not just
homonumia, `naming the same.'34
The choice of examples may seem to suggest the second of these two alterna-
tives. Socrates' nose is famous, and famously ugly;35 Theaetetus's snubness is
identied earlier in the dialogue as, along with his eyes that stick out, a distinc-
tive feature of him.36 And when we encounter the suggestion that Theaetetus
is to be identied by his snub nose, Socrates' rst question is why the thought
of snubness is not of his, Socrates', snubness, which was identied earlier as
more extreme even than Theaetetus's.37 In combination with the description
of the sun as the brightest object in the sky, this creates a set of examples that
suggest that thoughts tend toward the most extreme or most characteristic ref-
erents of the terms appearing in those thoughts. Given that the readers may
well have been sensitized by the Republic and the Phaedo, as discussed above,
to think of Forms as the proper referents of terms, both the choice of examples
and Socrates' reasons for why certain thoughts do not pick out Theaetetus can
be viewed as further support for such a theory of reference.38
Once again, we can note that the objection does not presuppose or require
34For an account along these lines, see [Taylor, 1996, p. 73]; for a discussion of epo^numia
vs. homonumia, see [Taylor, 1996, p. 71, n. 6].
35See [Brennan, 2007] on this subject.
36143e.
37Indeed, this remark, at 209b10-c3, is between one and two Stephanus pages from the end
of the Theaetetus, as the earlier remark is between one and two Stephanus pages from the
beginning of the dialogue. If Barney is correct that the Theaetetus is ring-composed (see
[Barney, 2013]), this is further evidence that we are meant to recall the fact that Socrates'
snub nose is more extreme and uglier than Theaetetus's.
38On such views of reference in Plato, see [Harte, 2007].
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a stance about whether logoi of uniqueness-descriptions provide correct charac-
terizations of items in the world. For all we (as readers of this section) know,
some such metaphysics as the following may be true: what there is in the uni-
verse is a set of items; those items are all dierent from each other, in the sense
that each item has some feature that no other item has; and for each item, that
item's unique feature provides a suitable logos of it in that specifying it suces
for saying what that item is.39 Even if all that were true, Socrates' objection to
this view of logos would go through. Whereas the third proposed view of logos,
and especially the example of the sun, might have caused us to suspect that the
problem with the view would be something about the way in which the logos
fails to \get at" the item in the world correctly, perhaps because uniqueness
is relational and thereby accidental, in fact Socrates' objection survives with-
out alteration even if such logoi are perfectly good as statements of (what we
might call) the essences of items.40 Whether or not logoi specify essences, and
whether or not we match up logoi with items correctly, Socrates here takes him-
self to have identied something about the structure of the distinguishing-mark
proposal that disqualies it from being a good account of knowledge.
1.5 Conclusion
If the preceding analyses of the three logos-proposals are correct, each of the
three theories' failures is independent of the suitability of the corresponding
logoi for describing the world. The stream-of-speech view fails even if such
39We may also suppose that one species these logoi correctly, though the example could
be modied to permit slight mistakes in one's specication of the various items.
40This conclusion is in some ways continuous with Kahn's remark that in the Theaete-
tus, as opposed to the Meno, \we look ... for a less metaphysically loaded notion of logos."
([Kahn, 2013, p. 77]) Kahn, however, seems to view the Theaetetus discussion as funda-
mentally epistemological as opposed to metaphysical because the Socrates of the Theaetetus
is \metaphysically barren" (p. 49 and elsewhere); I nd it hard to sustain such a view of
the Theatetetus in light of such passages as Theaet. 204a ., the mereology of which seems
thoroughly metaphysical.
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speech connects logoi to items in the right way; the down-to-the-elements view
fails even if such logoi correctly and fully describe things (and Socrates suggests
that they might); and the distinguishing-mark view fails even if things can be
picked out and described quite well with distinguishing marks.
In this way, the Theaetetus departs from earlier dialogues, where a common
reason to conclude that a candidate-knower fails to have knowledge is precisely
that the logos he oers inadequately describes what he is trying to describe. (So,
for example, at Meno 73d ., Socrates objects to Meno's proposed denition of
virtue as the ability to rule over people in part by noting that at least one sort
of ruling over people{ruling over people unjustly{is not virtue. There, Meno
fails to know at least in part because his logos does not correctly describe what
he thinks it describes.)
The dialogue does not tell us exactly what to make of this fact. One expla-
nation of it, however, is that there is something wrong with the whole project
of treating knowledge as true judgment with a logos. If the correct diagnosis of
the failure does not involve the metaphysical suitability of the logos-description,
we need to look elsewhere for it. Here, the schema itself{that is, the project of
looking for some conception of logos such that knowledge is true judgment with
a logos{is the obvious candidate.41
It is a further question what to make of this feature of the Theaetetus. Even
if one accepts that the dialogue leads the reader to reject the true-judgment-
plus-logos schema, it remains to gure out what replacement is suggested.
A rst way forward is the claim that the true judgment does not add anything
41This observation also oers a reason why Socrates discusses these three proposals in this
way. This explanation for the presence of these three alternatives is an alternative to a
view suggested by Shields: that Socrates (or Plato) simply believes these are the only three
possible candidates for a theory of logos.[Shields, 1999, p. 112] Shields appeals only to 206c7-8
to justify this claim. Socrates does say there that logos seems to mean one of three things,
but to conclude that Socrates' settled view is that only three views are possible puts a lot of
weight on that line, and to conclude (as Shields does) that Plato asserts that these are the
only three possibilities is more problematic.
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to the logos; this suggestion is made explicitly in the discussion of the third
logos-picture at 209d, and one might think that its prominence suggests that
readers are supposed to think about how far this suggestion generalizes. On
this view, the correct grasp of the essence or denition of an item itself suces
for knowledge.
A second way forward is to retain a two-factor schema and to accept that the
metaphysical suitability of the logos-factor is not the only necessary component.
This might in turn suggest a revision to a lesson many have taken from the
Republic: there, it might appear that, because there is a strong correspondence
between the metaphysical status of a thing and the metaphysical status of the
mental state corresponding to the thing, knowledge somehow consists in getting
one's soul in a state that mirrors or ts or otherwise corresponds to the thing
itself. One might then consider Theaetetus to enact or inaugurate a dierent
conception of epistemology from that one, insofar as it more strongly separates
theories of knowledge from theories of what things are. Because evaluating either
of these two suggestions would require a much longer inquiry, and because other
ways forward than these two are possible, I leave these as questions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Plato on uniformity
2.1 Introduction
In some texts that are central to Platonic metaphysics, we nd the claim that
certain objects are uniform (monoeides).1 This suggests that we will not have
a full understanding of Plato's metaphysics until we have good answers to the
question of what \uniformity" means in this context and of why these objects,
some of which seem to represent Forms, should be thought to be uniform.
One might dismiss these questions by claiming that the references to these
items' being monoeides are stray remarks or otherwise unimportant.2 An ex-
amination of Plato's usage of \monoeides," however, removes all temptation to
make such a dismissal. First, \monoeides" is a rare word. It is rare in the
Platonic corpus: its forms occur only eight times. And it is even rarer in fth-
and fourth-century Greek: our evidence suggests that it is actually a Platonic
1Throughout this essay, I will use the English \uniform" as a translation of convenience;
it is intended to mean whatever monoeides means. For a justication of the implicit premise
that the term's meaning is consistent, see below.
2Indeed, those commentators who do not pass over these references in silence often apol-
ogize for or gloss over them. So, for example, Allan Silverman mentions uniformity but gives
no extended treatment of it in [Silverman, 2002] and immediately calls into question the im-
portance of uniformity in [Silverman, 2014, section 4].
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coinage, and if it is not, it is rare enough that we have no attested uses of it
before Plato.3
Moreover, the eight Platonic uses of the word are spread across only ve
passages, and these include some of the texts that are most central to the devel-
opment of a metaphysics of Forms in the early and middle dialogues. Three of
the eight occur around Phaedo 78d, when Socrates is leading Cebes to agree that
The Equal and The Fine do not change at all. This fact about the immutability
of these items is said to follow from their being monoeides.
Another two of the eight occur at Symposium 211e1-4, in Diotima's famous
description of the \great sea of Beauty." In the next section, I examine these
two passages, which together provide the majority of the Platonic uses of \mo-
noeides" and should guide any interpretation of the term in Plato. I argue for
a \monopredicational" interpretation of uniformity. On this reading, what it
is for an item to be uniform, in this technical sense, is for it to bear a certain
strong relationship to exactly one predicate.4
Beyond the Phaedo and the Symposium, there are three nal uses of \mo-
noeides." In Republic X, Socrates argues that we need to look at the soul's
condition when it is doing philosophy in order to determine whether it is poluei-
des or monoeides,5 and at Timaeus 59b, one kind of water is singled out as
a monoeides genos. Finally, at Theaetetus 205d1, the stoikheia (elements), as
opposed to the sullabai (complexes), are said to be monoeides.
I put the Republic and Timaeus passages to one side6 and take up the
Theaetetus passage in section 3. By examining the \Dream" passage that in-
3There are three references for \monoeides" connected to pre-Platonic authors:
Anaximenes 2-6, Anaxagoras 46-6, and Empedocles 32-5. As Tad Brennan points out, how-
ever, these all, however, come from a doxography in Stobaeus, and there are no extant verbatim
uses of monoeides before Plato.
4Here as elsewhere, I conform to the literature by using \predicate" to mean not a linguistic
item but rather the feature to which such an item would refer.
5Rep. 612a.
6This is not to say that they present problems for my view; in notes 20 and 25 below I
briey indicate how these passages t the framework I lay out.
29
cludes the use of monoeides at 205d1, I sketch a picture of the metaphysics of
the Dream according to which the uniformity of the Forms, or of items that
seem to stand in for Forms, is metaphorically displayed in the stoikheia.
Although the uniform objects of the Symposium and Phaedo are traditionally
taken to represent Forms, much can be said about these texts without making
any assumptions about those objects' relationship to a theory of Forms. I con-
clude by considering how uniformity might gure in a metaphysics of Forms. I
will hold that whether or not one holds that uniformity is presented as a charac-
teristic of the Forms (of, say, the Republic), there is something of interest{and
indeed something of relevance to the metaphysics of Forms{in this thread of
Plato's thought.
2.2 Monopredicational uniformity
2.2.1 Uniformity in the Phaedo
Socrates, in the Phaedo passage that contains the occurrences of monoeides,
is discussing the nature of the soul. The argument of Phaedo 78 goes as fol-
lows: First, Socrates suggests that what is compounded (suntheton) is likely
to be taken apart, and what is not compounded (asuntheton) is not likely to
be taken apart. Second, Socrates suggests that what is constant is what is un-
compounded, and that what is changing and inconstant is what is compounded.
Third, Socrates concludes that the \uniform"7 \realities,"8 such as beauty itself
and equality itself, are immune from change and dispersion, insofar as they are
uniform; by contrast, items like humans and cloaks are always changing.
I will use two claims about this famous passage to help determine what
monoeides means there. One is that an item's susceptibility to change, and its
7monoeides, 78d5
8Note ousia at 78d1.
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stability, is here taken to be a matter of structure, and specically a matter of
its complexity. If we want to know whether an item is stable, it is important
to know whether or not it is a compound.9 This line of thought might seem
obviously problematic. It might seem to conate an item's synchronic features
with its diachronic ones, if we are inclined to think that change is fundamentally
diachronic and an item's simplicity or complexity is not. It might also seem to
run afoul of our instincts about stability: we might think we can come up with
examples of highly stable compounds and highly unstable non-compounds (as in
elementary chemistry, where we learn that some elements, like promethium, are
so unstable that all known samples of them have only lasted for small fractions
of a second, whereas some compounds, like diatomic nitrogen, are very stable).10
Despite these apparent diculties, however, Socrates' remarks here can be
motivated more easily than we might at rst think. First, it is at least a possible
view that an item with a completely unied internal structure (whatever internal
structure turns out to be) is not susceptible to change. Consider, for example,
a perdurantist view of change such as David Lewis's:11 he says that change
over time \is qualitative dierence between dierent stages{dierent temporal
9There are at least two things we might mean by \compound:" that of having any parts
whatsoever, so that (e.g.) a pile of gold dust would count as a compound, and that of
simultaneously being of dierent kinds (for example, by having parts of dierent kinds, as a
water molecule does in virtue of its hydrogen and oxygen). Certainly the rst sense must be
at issue, at least nearer the beginning of the argument: back at 70a, Cebes has described the
general fear of dying and having one's soul dispersed \like breath or smoke." These examples
are like that of the gold dust in that they involve items of one kind that nonetheless seem to
have identiable parts or at least subregions.
The discussion eventually, however, comes to encompass also the latter sense of \compound"
when it turns to each item \that really is, being uniform by itself, remain[ing] the same
and never in any way tolerat[ing] any change whatever." First, the etymology of monoeides
(\uniform") suggests that what is at issue is whether a given item is of one kind or of many
kinds. Second, the examples of The Equal and The Beautiful seem to be examples of what is,
e.g., only equal and nothing else; it is not clear how to make sense of these examples without
saying that they are not compounded in the rst sense.
10This is not to say that we would be correct to say that these observations provide even
prima facie refutations of Socrates' line of thinking here. Promethium is an element in the
sense laid out in chemistry textbooks, but it is obviously complex in the sense that it contains
many subatomic particles; when it decays, it falls apart. If we think that this makes it a
poor rejoinder to Socrates' claims here, that is some indication that the connection between
structure and mutability is a deep one, as Socrates claims it is.
11[Lewis, 1976, p. 1]
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parts{of some enduring thing, just as a `change' in scenery from east to west
is a qualitative dierence between the eastern and western spatial parts of the
landscape." If there is something to this Lewisian thought that change simply
is a dierence between parts of something, we might understand why Socrates
claims (i) that internal dierence is necessary for change and (ii) that internal
dierence makes something susceptible to change.
The rst of those two claims is entailed by (and weaker than) Lewis's; the
second is a modal variant of the Lewisian claim, but given the emphasis Socrates
places on the tendency of complex things to disperse, there is minimal dierence.
Of course, there are many dierences between what Lewis had in mind when
he discussed change, on the one hand, and the sorts of change and dispersion
under discussion at Phaedo 78, but the comparison might provide some intuitive
support for the view that only a compound can change; this in turn supports
my reading of monoeides. In combination with the further thought that the
only way to have a completely unied internal structure is to have a partless
internal structure{that is, to be in some sense only one thing{then something
like the view of uniformity I propose below might seem desirable, for the case
of unchanging items.
The second claim to be established about the Phaedo passage is that an
aspect of the dierence between compounded and uncompounded items is in
the way that they are related to each one of their constituents, and not just
in the way that they are related to the sum or total of those constituents.
Socrates says that when a human or a cloak is said to be something or other,
it is in that respect \named after"12 the corresponding \uniform" item. Some
particular horse is called beautiful and thereby comes to bear a certain name
(\beautiful"),13 whereas the corresponding unchangeable item simply is beauty
12to^n ekeinois homo^numo^n, 78e2; the \ekeinois" (\those") are the \realities" such as the
equal itself.
13This is true whether or not the name that is borne is primarily linguistic item or some
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itself. The dierence between a uniform and a non-uniform item is not only
a matter of how many features they bear; it is also a matter of the uniform
item's relationship to that one feature, which is not similarly manifested in any
of the homonymous items. Even if, per impossibile, one could strip away every
feature of the horse except for its beauty, what would be left would not be The
Beautiful, but rather just a decient instance of beauty.
These two features of Socrates' argument suggest the following construal of
\monoeides:" an item's being monoeides is its being exactly one thing.14 For a
given uniform item U that is described as \F -ness itself:"
 U is F
 U is not G, for all G 6= F
 Non-uniform items exhibiting F -ness are merely called F ; they are called
F in virtue of their relationship to U ; and they are thus F deciently.15
This reading of monoeides is supported by two more of the appearances of
monoeides, which occur at Symposium 211e1-4. There, we are asked to consider
what it would be like \if someone got to see the Beautiful itself (auto to kalon),
absolute, pure, unmixed, not polluted by human esh or colors or any other great
nonsense of mortality, but if he could see the divine Beauty itself in its one form
(monoeides)."16 Recall that here, The Beautiful, metaphorically evoked as the
\great sea of beauty," is said to be something that \always is and neither comes
to be nor passes away." It \is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor
non-linguistic item that Socrates nonetheless refers to as an onoma. For more discussion of
naming, see section 4.2 below.
14For these purposes we can take \being" predicatively. I am in fact skeptical that there
is a sharply distinguished or distinguishable predicative sense of being in Plato; on this, see
\The distinction between being and becoming as a distinction between kinds of predication."
15We might think that the uniform items are the Forms of some \theory of Forms" and that
the non-uniform items are the participants of such a theory. For now, I only aim to explain
the sense of the term monoeides in the Phaedo and the Symposium. I take up the question
of its relationship to a theory of Forms in the last section.
16Trans. Nehamas and Woodru.
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beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing
and ugly in relation to another, nor is it beautiful here and ugly there."
It is remarkable that the former description, in which (what we might call)
the purity of the Beautiful is emphasized, is the culmination of the line of
argument containing the latter descriptions. We might not have been surprised
that Diotima emphasizes that The Beautiful is not ugly, nor that she expands
on the ways in which something can be ugly. We might have expected such
considerations, however, to conclude with a general claim about The Beautiful
absolutely not being ugly. What we get, however, is rather a general claim
about The Beautiful not being \mixed" or \polluted by human esh or colors."
That is, the Beautiful's being absolutely beautiful seems to entail that it is only
beautiful.
Unless we are to assume that all mixture, esh, and color is a form of ugliness,
this is a radical expansion of the claim. The understanding of monoeides I
proposed above accounts for Diotima's being able to draw conclusions about
purity from claims about complete or absolute beauty. On this way of reading
the passage, Diotima is saying that what makes The Beautiful not admit of
ugliness in any respect{its being beautiful{also entails that there is nothing else
that it is. This is so because really being beautiful is only possible for a uniform
item{for beauty itself.17
At this point, one might object to the view of the Beautiful as only beautiful
by noting that, according to Diotima, it must also be not ugly. Thus, it might
seem that the very text that I adduce for support of my view undermines it
by suggesting that The Beautiful's not being ugly is on a par with its being
17Commentators sometimes pass over The Beautiful's being monoeides in their analyses of
the passage; e.g., [Dancy, 2004] glosses \itself by itself with itself" at 211b1 by noting that
The Beautiful is not something else (e.g., a speech) that is beautiful: \all it is, is beautiful" (p.
289). Dancy, in my view, is right about this, and understanding monoeides properly suggests
not only that The Beautiful is not some ordinary thing that is beautiful (or not only that
The Beautiful is both beautiful and also some not some ordinary thing), but also that The
Beautiful is also not anything else (ordinary thing or not).
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beautiful, which in turn would suggest that the monopredicational reading of
monoeides cannot be appropriate here.
A few considerations mitigate this concern. First, it is not clear that The
Beautiful's not being ugly is not a matter of its being not-ugly; that is, one might
think that its relationship to ugliness is nothing more than its relationship to
beauty. Rather than being not-ugly, it simply fails to be ugly. (Presumably,
commentators such as Dancy would agree with this.18)
According to this reading, this speech elaborates two senses in which The
Beautiful does not admit ugliness. First, as an entirely beautiful item, it is
beautiful and only beautiful. Because of this (and because ugliness is not iden-
tical to beauty), its relationship to ugliness (and even its lack of ugliness) cannot
be analogous to its relationship with beauty. Second, mixture or \pollution"
itself is ugliness or a kind of ugliness, at least when the primary element of the
mixture is beauty itself.19 Human esh and colors are not, after all, obviously
ugly things; it is the mere fact that beauty itself has been mixed, and not what
it has been mixed with, that makes mixture pollution or adulteration. As such,
The Beautiful's being monoeides makes it beautiful in this sense; uniformity
just is beauty. In this way, we can account for some important sense in which
The Beautiful is not-ugly or un-ugly without violating what I have proposed as
a uniformity constraint.20
18See previous footnote.
19Mixture itself might be a sort of pollution more generally: if the primary items are
supremely unied and therefore beautiful (perhaps in a sense analogous to that in which the
forms are all one), any sort of mixture would then be a sort of uglication, at least as far as
the most real items are concerned. The plausibility of this suggestion depends on one's view
about the relationship between the items that are said to be uniform and the Forms (especially
as they are discussed in the late dialogues). On this issue, see section 4.2 and section 5.
20Here there is a connection with Republic X, and specically 612a, where the last appear-
ance of monoeides occurs. At 611b, we are told that studying the soul \as it is in truth"
requires not seeing it \as it is while it is maimed by its association with the body and other
evils." Then, at 611e-612a, we nd the following description of the philosophical soul's desire
(as translated by Grube/Reeve, but giving the key terms in Greek):
...We must realize what it grasps and longs to have intercourse with, because it is
akin to the divine and immortal and what always is, and we must realize what it
would become if it followed this longing with its whole being, and if the resulting
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If the reading of monoeides I have suggested for the Symposium and the
Phaedo is correct, those two dialogues present a consistent picture of the meta-
physics of fundamental items. Those items are supremely simple: they have a
privileged relationship with exactly one item. Moreover, this simplicity is at
least partially the explanation of, and not explained by, other important char-
acteristics of the fundamental items: their being what other items are merely
called, their immutability, their beauty, and so on. Given this central role of
uniformity in the metaphysics of fundamental items thus sketched, we might
more readily understand why Plato chose to coin a technical term21 to mark it.
2.3 Uniformity and the stoikheia of the Dream
The last of the eight instances of monoeides in Plato occurs near the end of the
Theaetetus 205d1. There, Socrates and Theaetetus are discussing the nature
of elements (stoikheia). They have just agreed that, if letters are not parts
of syllables, then a syllable would be \some one partless form" (mia tis idea
ameristos). If this is true, however, there would be a surprising symmetry
between syllables and letters: each letter is monoeides (205d1), which would
make both the letter and the syllable simple. This symmetry threatens the
conclusion that letters are unknowable but the syllables knowable.
Here it is less important why this causes epistemological problems and more
eort lifted it out of the sea in which it now dwells, and if the many stones and
shells (those which have grown all over it in a wild, earthy, and stony profusion
because it feasts at those so-called happy feastings on earth) were hammered o
it. Then we'd see what its true nature is and be able to determine whether it [is
puloeide^s] or [is monoeide^s] and whether or in what manner it is put together.
Even putting aside the striking reference to being \lifted out of the sea" (which might be
thought to suggest a connection with the Symposium passage at hand), it is clear that the
uniform soul is uniform as a result of having sloughed o impurities and those items it had
been mixed with. While I will not give a complete reading of this Rep. X passage here, it
is at least prima facie plausible that what makes a uniform soul uniform is a purication by
means of philosophy that somehow eliminates all contaminants and leaves it in an unmixed
state.
21Or, perhaps, deploy an existing rare word; see the Introduction.
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important why the letters are analogous to the syllables in the rst place. In
Socrates' speech at 205c4-10, this appears to be because the syllables radically
lack features:
Now, my friend, a little while ago, if you remember, we were inclined
to accept a certain proposition which we thought put the matter
very well{I mean the statement that no account can be given of
the primaries of which other things are constituted, because each of
them is in itself incomposite; and that it would be incorrect to apply
even the term `being' to it when we spoke of it or the term `this,'
because these terms signify dierent and alien things; and that is the
reason why a primary is an unaccountable and unknowable thing.22
For any feature we might want to attribute to an element, if that feature
is something \other than" it, that feature cannot properly be attributed to it.
This requirement goes so far as to prevent us from attributing even being or
\this-ness" to the elements; as \being" and \this" are, for each element under
consideration, something other than the element, even those terms get ruled
out.
One might think that this requirement is an easily diagnosed mistake. It
might seem to arise from a confusion between not being the same thing as or
not being identical to something, on the one hand, and not being that thing in
the sense of bearing it or its homonymous property as a feature, on the other.
As there is vigorous debate about whether and where Plato distinguishes senses
of \is" in the way that we do,23 it might seem reasonable that this is one passage
where Plato or one of his characters is experimenting with the logic of related
identifying and predicational claims.
22Trans. Burnyeat/Levett. The previous speech to which Socrates refers is given below.
23On this issue, see \The distinction between being and becoming as a distinction in kinds
of predication."
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This cannot explain Socrates' remarks here, however. That stoikheia radi-
cally lack features is, in this argument, supposed to have something to do with
their being stoikheia; complexes do not share such a requirement. If the require-
ment arose from a confusion between predication and identity, or unusual-to-us
beliefs about the relationship between predication and identity, it would apply
to elements and complexes equally. Thus, whatever motivates this requirement
has something to do with the nature of stoikheia. These stoikheia are introduced
as follows, in the speech we have already seen Socrates refer back to:
Listen, then, to a dream in return for a dream. In my dream, too, I
thought I was listening to people saying that the primary elements,
as it were, of which we and everything else are composed, have no
account. Each of them, in itself, can only be named; it is not possible
to say anything else of it, either that it is or that it is not. That
would mean that we were adding being or not-being to it; whereas
we must not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself
alone. Indeed we ought not to apply to it even such words as \itself"
or \that," \each," \alone," or \this," or any other of the many words
of this kind; for these go the round and are applied to all things alike,
being other than the thing to which they are added, whereas if it were
possible to express the element itself and it had its own proprietary
account, it would have to be expressed without any other thing. As
it is, however, it is impossible that any of the primaries should be
expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that
it has...24
Here \name" must mean something like \feature" or property. (This might
seem implausible; I discuss this further below.) When the example of letters
24201d8-202b3, trans. Burnyeat/Levett.
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arises at 203b, it is supposed to be intuitive that S, for example, is \a mere
psophos (sound), like the hissing of the tongue" (203b4). That particular sound
is the only feature it has, in some strong sense of \has." The example involving
letters is explicitly given to elucidate the dream theory, and the letters them-
selves are the \primaries" of the example. Thus, the fact that, e.g., the letter S
has or is a certain sound (in the example) is very strong evidence that the ele-
ments of the dream \have only a name" not because it is somehow impossible to
describe them, or because they support only ostension, but rather because they
each have exactly one feature or property. Thus, monoeides, here in its eighth
and nal occurrence in the corpus, seems again to indicate that an item bears
exactly one feature (in a certain way).25 The picture of letters and syllables
that arises is:
 Any stoikheion is monoeides in the sense of having exactly one feature (or
bearing a special relationship to that one feature).
 For any feature in the relevant domain, there is a corresponding, unique
stoikheion.
 A syllable can also bear the relevant feature{e.g., the \SOC" in \SOCRATES"
has the feature that \S" has. But the syllable bears the feature (i) in a
derivative way and (ii) in virtue of its being properly related to the relevant
stoikheion.
25Note here that there is a striking similarity between the water that is a monoeides genos
at Timaeus 59b and the \mere psophos" that is the letter S here. Neither can be decomposed;
each is fundamental within its domain, though parasitic on something in a physically more
fundamental domain (the physics of sound in the Theaetetus and the triangular geometry
underlying everything in the Timaeus); and the items underlying it in that more fundamental
domain are undierentiated (the triangles in the case of the purest kind of water and the pure
hissing sound in the Theaetetus).
It is worth emphasizing that the fact that the water of the Timaeus is in some sense parasitic
on or built out of items from a more fundamental domain does not threaten my account of
uniformity here. Nothing in my account of the Theaetetus requires that uniform items be
independent of items in all other domains; indeed, it is all but explicit at Theaet. 203 that
letters in some sense correspond to physical motions of air. This does not prevent them
from being uniform as letters. (See also Theaet. 163b-c, where we are asked to consider the
experience of hearing the sounds of a foreign language.)
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In these respects, then, the stoikheia of the Dream are analogous to \beauty
itself," \the Fine itself," and so on, at least as those latter items are discussed in
the Phaedo and Symposium. This suggests one candidate for the identity of the
\Dream theorist:" it is Socrates himself, and the dream he shares is a dream
about the Forms.26
For all I have said, however, it remains possible the objects under discussion
in the Phaedo and the Symposium are not Forms and not meant to represent
Forms, and therefore that no uniformity constraint is intended to be part of a
metaphysics of Forms. I discuss this possibility in the Conclusion.
Whatever the uniformity constraint is a constraint on, however, one might
object to my construal of this constraint in various ways. These are the subject
of the next section.
2.4 Clarications and replies to objections.
2.4.1 Against an alternative reading of monoeides
After considering the evidence above, one might admit that monoeides is a rare
word used in striking ways, but attempt to account for this evidence dierently.
One might, for example, hold27 that, at least in the case of a Form, talk of
uniformity emphasizes that a Form is some one property, as opposed to the
many participants in the Form. On this view, talk of uniformity would echo
remarks according to which a Form is \the one over the many" and is F without
also being not-F.
On this view, monoeides would be a sort of contrast term to ta polla [F ] (the
many F s); more formally, it would indicate not that there is only one feature X
26Antisthenes is the usual suspect for those who attempt to identify the Dream theorist with
one of Plato's predecessors. On this issue, see [Burnyeat, 1970]. Note that this traditional
suggestion is compatible with the proposal that Socrates is dreaming about the Forms if there
is an element of Antisthenean thought in the metaphysics of Forms.
27Gail Fine raised this suggestion.
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such that The F is X (bears the feature X ) but rather that there is only one
item X such that X is the same item as The F. This would helpfully connect
this bit of technical vocabulary to something else frequently armed in the
dialogues (that is, that a Form is the one over the many). It would also explain
the striking recurrence of monoeides without attributing views to Plato that
one might nd unpalatable.
I reject this view, however, because it seems not to t the contexts in which
the term appears. Both in the Phaedo and at Theaet. 205d1, monoeides seems
clearly to contrast with some form of suntheton. I think this must indicate that
monoeides has something to do with structure and not with the number of items
that are The F, especially given the claim in the Phaedo connecting monoeides
with a lack of susceptibility to change. Of many things we might be tempted to
say that there is only one X such that X is that thing, and for many of those
there is no particular reason to think that this entails that X is immutable.
(Take X to be some particular human being, for example.)
Moreover, monoeides being a contrast term for ta polla [F ] cannot do justice
to the fact that Plato in fact gives a contrast term for monoeides: the term is
polueides (\multiform"). It appears seven times in the Platonic corpus,28 and it
is clearly a contrast term to monoeides (which we would expect from the form of
the word).29 The term consistently indicates something about structure and not
something about how many of an item there are. So, for example, at Republic
612a, Socrates asks whether the soul in its truest, puried form is uniform or
multiform; he is plainly not asking whether it is one item or many instances
of a kind. At Phaedrus 270d-271a, Socrates asks whether a certain nature is
uniform or multiform, and he is asking about the simplicity or complexity of
28This includes all cases, as is indicated by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae and other sources
of evidence. It does not, however, include the proper name \Polueidon" that appears in the
(likely spurious) Second Letter.
29It is explicitly used as a contrast term at, for example, Republic 612a4 and Phaedo 80b4.
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one nature, not about the cardinality of its instantiations.
Finally, on the view of monoeides at hand (but not on the view I suggest),
monoeides must mean something dierent in the Timaeus and Republic X from
what it means in the Theaetetus, the Phaedo, and the Symposium. (Marking o
one kind of water seems not to t with the reading at hand, and neither does
inquiring about whether the soul is monoeides when it is suitably puried.) Of
course, words are often used dierently in dierent contexts, but given the rarity
and technical import of monoeides, I take this to be an undesirable result.
2.4.2 The plausibility of monopredicational views
One might think that monopredicational views of any items (to say nothing of
the items at issue in the Dream) are obvious non-starters, simply because it is
obvious that there are no items such that they only bear one feature.
A rst reply here begins with an observation that was available both in the
Phaedo and Theaetetus passages: the relation that a uniform item bears to the
feature in virtue of which it is uniform is somehow special; the monopredica-
tional constraint applies only to that special kind of predication. The Phaedo
discusses the special strength of the relationship between the feature and the
\realities" that correspond to those features, whereas the Theaetetus empha-
sizes the relative deciency of the relationship between the stoikheion and the
other features (even ones so basic{e.g., being \this"{we might not even think
they are features, properly speaking). In both texts, however, there is at least
implicitly a distinction between what is merely truly predicated of an item, on
the one hand, and what is more strongly related to that item, on the other.
Other replies to this objection depend on other views one might hold about
these passages in which uniformity is discussed. To simplify matters, I will con-
sider a coarse distinction in the ways one might take these texts. One might,
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on the one hand, hold that all these texts are intended as (perhaps veiled)
contributions to a metaphysics of Forms that Plato might have endorsed. Al-
ternatively, one might hold that, although at least the Phaedo and Symposium
passages seem clearly to have some relationship to the metaphysics of Forms
(that Plato would have endorsed), this relationship is loose and/or metaphori-
cal, or otherwise not intended to be taken as a contribution to Plato's considered
metaphysics. (Nothing I say above rules out such an option.) On this alterna-
tive, these texts might be thought to generate a minor thread of metaphysical
thought in Plato.
Whichever view one holds about the relationship between uniformity and
the metaphysics of Forms, however, there are resources available to make the
notion of uniformity intelligible. On the rst alternative, where uniformity is
a doctrine about Forms, the distinction between being and becoming is one
way of making sense of a distinction between kinds of predication.30 Once that
distinction is intelligible, the uniformity constraint passes at least a minimal
standard of reasonability, as discussed above.
On the second alternative, the distinction between being and becoming is less
obviously connected to the items that are said to be uniform (though it still sug-
gests some Platonic precedent for distinguishing between kinds of predication).
Other texts, however, in which views are discussed and explicitly rejected, would
become more relevant in this case. Such texts speak to the question whether
Plato discusses (even where he would not endorse) views according to which
there are several kinds of predication. Here I will consider one such passage,
from the Sophist, that is of obvious relevance to questions about unformity and
that{I will argue{also necessitates a distinction between kinds of predication.
In that passage, the Eleatic Visitor says, about certain people:
30See \The distinction between being and becoming as a distinction in kinds of predication,"
where I argue that the being/becoming distinction is to be so understood.
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Straight away, they get their hands on the objection that it is im-
possible for the many to be one or the one many, and they clearly
delight in not allowing us to call man good, but rather the good
good and man man. You have come across people who enthuse
about such things often, I suppose, Theaetetus, sometimes elderly
men who have marveled at such things through poverty of intellect
and think themselves to have discovered something tremendously
clever. (Soph. 251b4-c6)31
The Late-Learners, as Fine32 says, \deny that one thing can be predicated
of another." The sense in which this passage supports the `monopredicational'
reading of monoeides, or at least the possibility that Plato countenanced such
a view, is clear: for each item, the Late-Learners say that only one thing can
correctly be attributed to it. Less obviously, this passage also provides yet an-
other sketch of a metaphysics, or of a metaphysical argument, in which there are
31This translation is Verity Harte's (see [Harte, 2002, p. 140]), and I have preferred it to
other available translations (e.g., Nicholas White's and Harold Fowler's), largely because it
makes the fewest presuppositions about precisely what the various instances of `man' and
`good' refer to. Tad Brennan points out that Harte manages even to suppress the copula in
the key sentence (\...the good good and man man"), which{given the dicult questions about
the import of verbs of being in Plato{is desirable.
32[Fine, 2008, p. 18]. This is a more felicitous characterization of the problem than as a
\denial of predication" (see [Brown, 2008, p. 438, inter alia]), which entails that calling man
\man" and calling good \good" do not count as predications. Such a view was advanced by
Ackrill, who held that the Late-Learners' sentences are identifying and not predicative uses of
\is" (see [Ackrill, 1971]). Ackrill's view has faced much criticism; for a summary of the issue,
see [Brown, 2008, section 2.1]. Brown's own view is that Plato in the Sophist distinguishes
identity-statements from other statements (rather than distinguishing identifying uses of \is"
from other uses of \is"). Brown is clear that what follows \is" can thus be related to the
subject of the sentence in dierent ways, and not because \is" is ambiguous. As her primary
focus is the Communion of Kinds, it is not clear whether she would view the Late-Learners
as using one of two kinds of predication.
I will not argue explicitly against the view that sentences like \man man," as produced by
the Late-Learners, involve predication. My discussion of the passage below is in part intended
as a further argument against Ackrill-type views, which (as will become clear) do not do well
at explaining why we nd the self-refutation charge we nd in the text.
Harte holds that the Late-Learners deny that composition occurs ([Harte, 2002, p. 169]). I
agree that, insofar as composition entails that the name of one part can be predicated of the
whole (or of another involved part), the Late-Learners deny that such composition occurs.
I doubt that material composition is Plato's primary focus in this passage, however, both
for reasons that will become clear below, and because of his choice of example (calling man
\good" is not a straightforward case of making an assertion that a case of composition has
occurred).
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several kinds of predication. This is because the Late-Learners require claims
involving non-monopredicational predications. First, they marvel at their the-
ories, enthuse about metaphysics, and delight at disagreeing with people, all of
which presumably require one to assert things with structures more complex
than \man man" and \good good." More importantly, however, they seem
to explicitly assert logoi that necessitate other predications. Thus, the Late-
Learners need to maintain that there is a weaker sort of predication available
to them in such assertions.
Here one might object that the Late-Learners are charged with self-refutation,
and that their theories are quickly rejected on such grounds. This might make it
seem that they do not have a distinction in kinds of predication, because there
is no reason given that such a distinction, or anything else, saves them from such
immediate refutation. Indeed, we might think that the Late-Learners' theory
is so implausible that a swift rejection is a more appropriate response than the
construction of an elaborate metaphysics on their behalf.
This would be too hasty, however; the refutation we nd is slightly dierent
from the one we might expect, and it suggests that the Late-Learners do rely
on a sort of distinction in kinds of predication. Although the Late-Learners
are charged with a sort of self-refutation{in the Eleatic Visitor's ventriloquism
metaphor, with having an enemy inside of them33{the self-refutation charge is
not one of (what we might call) pragmatic contradiction. Rather, they are said
to connect, in their logoi, \being" and everything (for example). The problem,
then, is not that they behave in a way that presupposes that ordinary, intuitive
predications of one thing to another are possible; the problem is that their
logoi, their considered views of a certain sort, presuppose other predications
than those of the sort that connect \man" to man and \good" to good. This
is suggested by the fact that the damning evidence is not that they implicitly
33252c4-6.
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connect \marvelous" to a certain theory, but rather that they cannot produce
logoi without using, e.g., \being," \separate" (kho^ris), \by itself" (kath'auto),
and \from others."34
Given what is{and, equally importantly, what is not{said in criticism of the
Late-Learners' view, it seems that we are to reconstruct the dialectic suggested
by the Eleatic Visitor's remarks as follows. First, the Late-Learners assert that
one can only call man \man," good \good," and so on. Their interlocutors
react not by complaining that their behavior manifests a commitment to other
predications, but rather by questioning them as any vigilant interlocutor might
(\What is wrong with predicating \good" of a man?"). Here the Late-Learners
respond by saying, approximately, that man itself is separate, or is separate
from other items. The text does not say this explicitly, but it is suggested in
two ways: rst, it is as reasonable a justication for their views as one is likely
to construct; second, it is what we get if we treat the evidence adduced against
them{\being," \separate", \by itself," and \from others"{as pieces of a puzzle
to be assembled.
These responses, however, are not ohand comments or implicit beliefs but
philosophical commitments they do or must assert. Moreover, they necessitate
the Late-Learners' positing a distinction between kinds of predication. They
hold that there is a certain sort of attribution according to which only \good
good" and the like are possible; they also hold that logoi such as \[the] good is
separate" are correct logoi. The best explanation of this seems to be that the
status of those two claims is dierent; the way in which [the] good is good, which
is the way in which [the] good is not separate or anything else, is dierent from
the way in which the [the] good is separate. And, barring exotic paraphrases
34Those inclined nd a connection between the Late-Learners' theory and a theory of Forms
here might be struck by these examples of unavoidable or irresistable components of logoi ;
they are terms one would use to describe Forms. These also (and, I think, relatedly) include
terms that explicitly could not be said of stoikheia at 201d8-202b3; see section 3 above.
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of either of these two claims, this is just to say that the Late-Learners are
committed to there being several kinds of predication.
2.4.3 Name-application as predication
Another objection to the view of \monoeides" advanced above is that it in-
volves a simple mistake in the linguistics and metaphysics of names. According
to this objection, the eect of attributing a name to an item is not to attribute
a property to it but simply to refer to it, roughly in the way that a demon-
strative allows us to refer to something.35 So, for example, McCabe holds that,
because the Dream's elements can only be named, they are \indescribable" and
\cannot have any properties."36 Moreover, Ryle famously held that the distinc-
tion between the elements and complexes could be put in terms of the sorts of
speech-acts that elements do and do not support;37 evidently, he took the talk of
\naming" stoikheia quite literally and in a familiar modern sense of naming.38
35It might be useful to put this point in the way it arises in elementary formal semantics.
There, one learns to distinguish the truth-conditions of \John is in the market" from those
of \A lawyer is in the market." To a rst approximation, the latter is true if and only if,
for some X, X is in the market and X is a lawyer. The truth-conditions of \John is in the
market," though, are importantly disanalogous to those. \John is in the market" is true if
and only if John{that is, whomever \John" refers to{is in the market. For a discussion of the
contemporary semantics of proper names, see [Heim and Kratzer, 1998, section 2.1].
36See [McCabe, 1994, p. 158]. In McCabe's preferred terminology, they are \aus-
tere," \having no properties and standing in no relations that might impair their
simplicity."[McCabe, 1994, p. 4]
37See [Ryle, 1990]
38Ryle also found, in the Dream passage, a metaphysics of \simple nameables." Thus his
view has a surface similarity to the one I suggested above, even though Ryle held that the
Dream's stoikheia, and not its sullabai, are those simple nameables. His view diers from that
one in other fundamental respects besides:
First, according to the view I suggested, the simplicity of the basic items is metaphysical
simplicity: it is a matter of admitting a privileged sort of predication with exactly one item.
Ryle takes it to be logical or linguistic simplicity, so that a reference to a Form is unanalyzable,
whereas speech-acts corresponding to complex items can be analyzed.
Second, I interpret the nameability in question to concern the predication of an onoma to
a subject, whereas Ryle takes it to be naming in a modern technical sense; see below.
Third, Ryle \nd[s] no internal evidence that Plato was in this dialogue bothering his head
at all about that somewhat over-ripe Theory [viz., the theory of Forms]." (p. 44, bracketed
note mine). It seems to me plausible that the similarities between the (proto-)theory of letters
and syllables, on the one hand, and Forms and participants, on the other, orient this portion
of the Theaetetus quite directly toward a `classic' theory of Forms in a way that Plato carefully
crafted.
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A full discussion of onomata (names) in Plato cannot be given here. A few
considerations, however, weigh in favor of the view that the names of the Dream
really are something like properties or features.39
First, the picture of naming that would have to be imported into the Theaete-
tus on the contrasting view is itself subject to dispute.40 Thus, insofar as
commentators simply assume such a view as the correct one, thereby to be at-
tributed to Plato other things equal, the motivation for the resulting accounts
is somewhat reduced.
Second, the Platonic corpus generally includes a broad sense of naming that
involves the attribution of a property to something.41 Something like this sense
seems to be operative in the Theaetetus passage. That is, this (in this context)
doesn't apply to an item insofar as one is ostending it; it applies to an item
insofar as it already is this (or perhaps a this), and thereby has a feature that
makes it apt to be named this.
Third, even where Plato discusses a notion of naming that seems to corre-
spond to what we have in mind when we think about naming (that is, what
Kripke took himself to be discussing in Naming and Necessity), he seems not to
have held that names function the way that \logically proper names" in Rus-
Fourth, Ryle imports a picture of knowledge according to which knowledge is propositional,
so that \if a Form is a simple object or a logical subject of predication, no matter how sublime,
then its verbal expression will be a name and not a sentence; and if so, then it will not be
false but nonsense to speak of anyone knowing it (savoir) or not knowing it, of his nding it
out, being taught it, teaching it, concluding it, forgetting it, believing, supposing, guessing, or
entertaining it, asserting it, negating it, or questioning it." The Theaetetus at least apparently,
however, countenances knowledge of items such as Theaetetus and the sun, perhaps along with
knowledge of propositions (though on this issue see [Fine, 1979]). Thus it is not clear that
Ryle's epistemology is fully relevant to the Theaetetus.
39More precisely, the view defended here is that onoma can refer to either a property/feature
or the (linguistic) item used to pick it out, and that any latter item corresponds to some
property/feature. That names must at least be the latter sort of thing (that is, linguistic
items) is clear. That features themselves must also be onomata is entailed by, for example,
the statement that \a name is all that [an element] has." (I give a reading of that claim and
argue against competing readings of it in the previous section.)
40For a thorough criticism of the contrasting view and defense of the view that names are
predicates, see [Fara, 2015].
41On this see [Fine, 1979, II-III].
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sell's sense function.42 Again, in the Dream, even the terms corresponding to
our \demonstratives" (e.g., this) do not function that way.43 From these con-
siderations I conclude that we are justied in taking names, at least at the end
of the Theaetetus, as being or attributing properties.
2.5 Conclusion
A central aim of this essay has been fairly modest: to catalogue and, as far
as possible, explain Plato's remarkable tendency to insert a certain rare term,
probably a coinage, into some of the most exciting and important passages in
the corpus. I hope to have shown that the term monoeides consistently indicates
42In this I agree with commentators including Gail Fine, who has argued against G.E.L.
Owen's view that Platonic names are \simple proxies for their nominees;" see [Fine, 1977],
especially section 3. For Owen's view, see [Owen, 1999]. For an argument that the truth-
conditions of sentences like \John is in the market" are isomorphic to those of \A lawyer is
in the market" even in Stoic treatments of language and metaphysics, see [Frede, 1994, c.
pg. 22]. (I assume that the Stoics' having such a view is at least weak and possibly strong
evidence that no deviation from this view is present in Plato.)
43Commentators have held that at the end of the Theaetetus, `this' and `that' do in fact
function as demonstratives in something like the sense that contemporary philosophers would
treat demonstratives. Christine Thomas, in [Thomas, 2002], is a notable example of this view.
She holds that `this' and `that' in the third denition of logos function as demonstratives in
such phrases as `this snubness' and `that cactus.'[Thomas, 2002, p. 66 .]
Thomas's view is more mysterious than it might rst appear, however. Her notion of a
demonstrative is neither that of contemporary philosophers nor one that is easily found in
Plato. Specically, it cannot be a close relative of a Russellian view according to which such
terms function as `logically proper names.' This is because Thomas holds that looking at a
cactus and thinking `that,' or saying `that' while attempting to refer to the cactus, does not
establish that the reference of your thought or speech is the cactus, as opposed to the book
next to the cactus. To establish such reference, one has to add a sortal such as `cactus' and
say something like `this cactus' or `that cactus.'[Thomas, 2002, p. 67] Perhaps this is true,
but if it is true, it shows that `that' is not anything like a logically proper name. Suppose that
the cactus were named `Fred;' we would think it strange if someone claimed that thinking
or saying `Fred' is insucient to establish the cactus, as opposed to the book next to the
cactus, as the referent of the thought or speech. If this were a true view of `Fred'-thoughts
and `Fred'-speech-acts, it would show that names do not function as we think they do, and
certainly not as logically proper names.
Moreover, Thomas's view faces a textual problem. She suggests that one of the koina must
be added to `this' or `that' in order to secure reference to an item.[Thomas, 2002, p. 67] Yet,
in the discussion of perception at 184-186, the koina include such items as being and sameness
(see [Thomas, 2002, p. 57]), which do not correspond to sortal terms like `cactus' or `book.'
Thus not all koina avoid the problem of being applicable to anything, and it is not one of
the koina, qua being one of the koina, that will solve the problem. As the very name koina
(roughly, \common") suggests, the function of such terms seems not to be to identify some
terms as opposed to all others.
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a certain simplicity of structure that amounts to its bearing only one feature,
or bearing only one feature in a certain privileged way.
Beyond this attempt to explain a Platonic notion of uniformity, one might
draw a variety of broader lessons from the texts and considerations that I have
discussed. I have said very little about any theory of Forms so far, because my
suggestions about what to make of the term monoeides are largely independent
of one's preferred view of the Forms (and of such questions as whether Plato's
considered views of Forms changed between dialogues).
The subject of uniformity is of obvious interest in any complete theory of
Forms, but what I have said so far leaves open the relationship between a view
of uniformity and a theory of the Forms. I conclude by surveying a few options
for what that relationship might be.
A rst option is to conclude that there is a Platonic doctrine of the uniformity
of Forms: that is, that a theory of Forms or some version of such a theory
includes Forms that are uniform in this sense. On this view, these texts and
considerations are intended as elaborations of a metaphysics that Plato would
have endorsed, and this doctrine is intended to be fully consistent with (or
perhaps even a necessary accompaniment to) other doctrines about the Forms.
So, for example, one might consider two reasonably Platonic-sounding doc-
trines about Forms: rst, that for all F, anything that is F is so by its relation-
ship to The F, so that The F is F in virtue of itself and that any other F item
is F merely by its relationship to The F ; second, that there is a deep dierence
between an item's bearing a feature in virtue of itself and bearing that feature
in virtue of its relationship to something else. From these two claims, it then
follows that there is a deep dierence between the way that a Form bears one
feature and how it bears every other feature. A doctrine of uniformity might be
thought to be an elaboration or explanation of this consequence.
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Alternatively, one could diagnose either of those two claims as a sloppy
formulation of some Platonic doctrine, and one could hold that any such \deep
dierence" between the way The F is F and the way it is anything else is not
to be made out in terms of kinds of predication. Thus, one might hold that
the objects said to be uniform are only images about Forms or items used in
the development of Forms, and that those items or images are disanalogous to
Forms in respect of uniformity. On this view, for example, the \communion of
kinds"44 might be taken as straightforward evidence against the claim that the
Forms are uniform, rather than as a revision or extension of a classic theory of
Forms. Deciding which of these two alternatives is preferable requires settling,
or at least considering, many questions that I do not take up here. (These
include questions about the correct interpretation of self-predication, the unity
of Plato's thought, Plato's view of identity and his use of einai, and many more.)
Even on this second alternative, however, it would remain true that there is
a set of texts and arguments that, however briey, suggest that basic items are
uniform. There would also be at least a few textual connections and structural
analogies between these basic items, so elaborated, and the Forms. On this
view, what Socrates says about stoikheia still has nontrivial connections to a
theory of Forms: the Dream of the Theaetetus would still count as a dream
about the Forms, albeit a fuzzier one.
Finally, one might hold that these texts have nothing much to do with the
Forms at all: on this view, the great sea of beauty in the Symposium, for exam-
ple, is not intended to represent a Form, or is intended only as an inspirational
image of a certain sort. Even on such a view, however, these various suggestions
about one-feature-bearing items{from the great sea of beauty, to the stoikheia of
the Theaetetus, to the uncompounded \realities" of the Phaedo, to everything in
the Late-Learners' metaphysics{would still be importantly similar, even if they
44See Sophist 254b .
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are all only foils to which the Forms are to be constrasted.
Whichever of these views one prefers, understanding Plato's various discus-
sions of uniformity is useful for understanding his metaphysics more generally.45
I hope to have shown that these discussions are more unied and more interest-
ing than they might rst appear.
45This is true even on the third view. It is widely thought, for example, that Socrates'
arguments for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo are not very good, and indeed that
Plato recognized this. If the argument from dispersion is such an argument, it would be useful
to recognize its dependence on metaphysical views that Plato elaborates elsewhere.
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Chapter 3
The distinction between
being and becoming as a
distinction in kinds of
predication
3.1 Introduction
There is general agreement that the distinction between being (to einai) and
becoming (to genesthai) is an important part of Platonic metaphysics. There is
much less agreement on precisely what is thus distinguished. Here I will examine
one dimension along which interpretations of the distinctions dier: whether the
distinction is to be understood as a distinction between kinds of predication.
After discussing what is meant by a distinction in \kinds of predication," I will
oer several indirect arguments that the Platonic distinction is indeed such a
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distinction, or at least that some such distinction is at various places suggested
(whether or not Plato would have endorsed it).
From now on I will use \PD" to refer to the claim that the distinction
between einai and gignesthai is a kind of predication. But what is PD? It is
often said that PD is mysterious or even unintelligible.1 PD is perhaps most
easily introduced by a metaphor: In the state of New York and elsewhere, one
has committed grand larceny if one has committed larceny and other conditions
are true (e.g., if the object of the larceny has a value over $1000, or if the object
is a public record, or if the object is stolen from an ATM). PD is the claim that
gignesthai does not stand to einai as grand larceny stands to larceny; it is not
simply some qualied sort of being. So to say that X becomes F is not to say
that X is F temporarily; or that X is F accidentally; or that X is some G such
that G and F are suitably related (by approximation or similarity, say); or that
X is undergoing some process that will culminate in X 's being F.
This essay collects a set of indirect arguments for PD ; none is intended as
an independent proof that Plato must have endorsed PD, but each presents
some evidence for the claim or answers some objection to it. The rst of these
looks at the poetry-interpretation scene of the Protagoras, and observes that
Socrates' rst remarks on the Simonides passage seem to entail a PD-requiring
view of the einai -gignesthai distinction. The second indirect argument begins
from the observation that non-historical or \pre-theoretical" considerations are
explicitly or implicitly involved in many arguments against PD. I argue that
such considerations do not weigh nearly as strongly against PD as is often
supposed: Our ordinary ways of talking and thinking suggest PD or something
that is compatible with PD, as do some dicult puzzles about predication and
identity. The nal argument is that familiar conclusions about \einai" and
\gignesthai" themselves, as they are used in Plato's Greek, gives some support
1On this, see section 3 below.
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for PD. This argument will also include a digression into the Sophist, which is
the subject of a debate that is taken to undermine PD-involving readings of the
einai -gignesthai distinction; I will suggest that the Sophist does not so clearly
show what it is sometimes taken to show, and that PD is largely independent
of this debate in any event.
These arguments partially establish that Plato found PD worthy of discus-
sion; this leaves the question whether Plato endorses PD, perhaps as an aspect
of a theory of Forms. I do not attempt to decide that question, but I conclude
by suggesting that PD is more compatible with a full range of Platonic texts
than it is sometimes taken to be. There, Phaedo 79 will serve as a case study.2
If these arguments succeed, they might t into some such traditional picture
of Form-metaphysics as the following:
 For any property F, there is exactly one Form (\The F," \The Form of
F -ness," \The F itself") corresponding to F.
 The F can be said to be F.
 Any ordinary item that manifests F -ness cannot be said, strictly speaking,
to be F ; rather, it becomes F.
 For any Form of F, its property (F ) is unique (so that dierent Forms
must correspond to dierent properties).
On this view, Forms are the only items that can be said to be anything,
and participants cannot be said to be anything at all, strictly speaking. This
outline should be treated as a rst approximation, as it leaves many questions
2Throughout this essay I follow tradition in using \becoming" as a translation of conve-
nience for forms of gignesthai. In doing so I do not intend to presuppose that any single
English sense of \become" does or does not capture the sense of Plato's technical sense of
gignesthai. I also do not claim that every Platonic usage of gignesthai is of the sort described
here; my claims rather concern the technical sense of gignesthai as it appears at Theaetetus
153, Protagoras 339, and elsewhere.
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unresolved (for example: What is the status of such claims as \The Good is
one"? Is that a case of full-edged being, thus entailing that items other than
The F can be F, or is it a case of mere becoming, in which case Forms take part
in that decient form of property-manifestation?). I take up such questions and
defend this picture of Form-metaphysics elsewhere.3
3.2 The Protagoras and the Frede-Code exchange
In a scene of the Protagoras,4 Socrates and Protagoras discuss an ode of Si-
monides', and in the course of the conversation, Socrates invokes a distinction
between being and becoming in order to defend himself from Protagoras' charge
that he, Socrates, has endorsed contradictory claims. Socrates rst agrees that
Simonides' ode was composed panu kalo^s te kai ortho^s (quite well and prop-
erly).5 But Socrates also agrees that a poem is not well made if the poet
contradicts himself. Yet the ode says both that that it is hard to become good
(agathon genesthai) and that Pittacus was wrong to say that it is hard to be
good (esthlon emmenai). Thus Socrates is committed to the consistency of those
two latter claims, and thus to the claims that it is hard to become good and
that it is not hard to be good. These seem to the audience plainly to contradict
each other.6
3See \Plato on uniformity."
4Prot. 339a1 .
5Prot. 339b6.
6It might be objected at this stage that it is a non-starter to claim that this Protagoras
passage is at all relevant to the four-point metaphysical schema outlined at the end of the
preceding section: after all, the passage deals with a given human being's either being or
becoming good. Since human beings are participants, and thus \in the realm of participation"
according to the above schema, that schema must not be applicable.
This objection is too quick, however, for two reasons. First, for Socrates' interpretation of
the poem to make sense, he only needs the truth of the claim that being and becoming are
dierent; his reputation is staked on the claim that Simonides' ode is consistent, not that its
every line is true. Thus, it might be acceptable for Socrates to leave Simonides committed to
the view that a human being could really be good without himself endorsing a counterexample
to the claim that participants only become. Second, Socrates in fact does not commit even
Simonides to the claim that a human being can be good: he nally interprets the poem in
such a way that the reason it is not hard to be good is that it is impossible to be good (344e).
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Socrates, to everyone's surprise, resolves this problem, at least temporarily,
by invoking a distinction between being and becoming{that is, he claims that
because to einai diers from to genesthai, Simonides does not contradict himself
by asserting that only one of agathon genesthai and esthlon emmenai is easy.7
We can already see that there is something strange about Socrates' plan here:
while loudly making a ne distinction between two verbs of being, he quietly
ignores any dierences between agathon and esthlon. For Socrates to be insisting
on one distinction while ignoring such an obvious other one suggests that he is
not, and does not take himself to be, reporting facts about the most natural
understandings of the words in the poem, or how those words would ordinarily be
understood by Greek speakers. His exegetical method is not one that is strongly
beholden to facts about ordinary language; if it were, he would have been more
likely to examine the distinction with a stronger basis in ordinary Greek usage.8
Rather, Socrates is taking a distinction that is not primarily linguistic and
mapping it onto the linguistic distinction between einai and gignesthai ; he is
redeploying language to philosophical ends.9 I will hold that PD is true of
Socrates' distinction between einai and gignesthai here;10 he is not saying that
undergoing a certain process is hard whereas having nished that process is
easy, nor that being good for a long time is hard but that being good for a
short time is easy, nor that being good essentially is easy whereas being good
accidentally is hard. Rather, he is saying that manifesting goodness is hard but
that having a good character is, for a good person, easy. Even if he only says this
7Prot. 340b7.
8This is consistent with independent analysis of the usage patterns of einai and gignesthai,
which have long been held to have been close in meaning and frequently interchangable in the
Greek, in a tradition that goes back at least to [von Wilamowitz-Moellendor, 1913].
9This is supported by the philological work (e.g., that in [Carson, 1992] and
[Woodbury, 1953]) on Socrates' use of hyperbaton; [Carson, 1992, pgs. 112, 122-3] (on alatheo^s
and heko^n) are particularly useful and emphasize the unnaturalness, from a purely poetic point
of view, of Socrates' reading. The less natural Socrates' exegesis is as a matter of literal inter-
pretation of the poetry, the more reasonable it is to think that he is intentionally redeploying
language for the sake of a philosophical lesson.
10Again, \here" in this context will indicate the
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in the context of a rst, provisional denition, it requires some metaphysical
explanation, and this explanation will indicate something about what might
have been intelligible to Plato.
This way of understanding how Socrates resolves his problem is controversial,
and the passage has generated a debate in which there are two major camps. One
roughly follows the line set out above; the other holds that \gignesthai" simply
means \coming to be," thus rejecting PD (in the context of the Protagoras, at
least). Here I will use an exchange between Michael Frede and Alan Code11 to
represent the debate; Frede famously defended (what I call) PD in this context,
and Code has disagreed both by arguing directly against Frede's view and by
holding that a better reading of the distinction can be had by taking `becoming'
as simply `coming to be.'
For Frede, PD is true of einai and gignesthai in Plato, and moreover it is
at least latent in Thucydides and other sources with which Plato would have
been familiar. To become F, on this view, is to manifest F-ness or to display
its marks.12 It is not to be F, to be engaged in a process that would naturally
terminate in being F, or anything similar.13
Why might one think that there is a whole kind of predication reserved for
\displaying marks" or \manifesting features" and that this sort of predication
is not somehow reducible to being or paraphrasable in terms of being, the way
that the denition of grand larceny can be built entirely upon the denition of
larceny? A very general sort of answer is that there appear to be cases where
an item in some sense manifests F -ness but where we would not want to say
that it is F. I now turn to these examples, each of which leads to some further
11[Frede, 1988] and [Code, 1988]; these are revised and edited versions of a paper and com-
ments from the twenty-sixth Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.
12[Frede, 1988]; one discussion appears on p. 47.
13As I implied above, there are other views of this type, articulated in such texts as
[Mann, 2000] and [Meinwald, 1991]. Much of the Frede-Code debate applies to this larger
class of views and to those views' critics.
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reasons why one might hold PD.
As a rst example, we might take the example of a white item with which
Socrates introduces the being/becoming distinction in the Theaetetus.14 Ac-
cording to the conjectural theory of vision that Socrates lays out,15 an instance
of whiteness is not to be identied with the perceptive agent or the perceived
patient, but is rather something that arises from the appropriate motion's hit-
ting the eye.16 The whiteness of the white item, then, is the most transient sort
of item (so transient that it has no location17), and the item is said to be white
because of the most temporary and coincidental sort of relationship to it. We
don't make a mistake when we talk about, for example, \that white cloud," but
a correct analysis of color and of perception reveals that the item merely shows
up as white, and should not be described as really being white; as Socrates sets
the scene, there is no stable whiteness for it to be, and the whiteness is quite
literally separated from the white item.
This example from the Theaetetus, besides establishing Platonic precedent
for PD, suggests reasons for holding PD (about einai and gignesthai) that do not
rely on a certain theory of color or of perception: A thing's features sometimes
\oat free" from it in such a way that we are tempted to say that the thing
isn't really being them. (Consider how we sometimes say that someone \has
the shakes" or \is having a laugh.") Moreover, we might think that there are
categorical constraints on features that a thing really is{e.g., that they must
have a place or must persist over time{and that certain features do not meet
those constraints (\an anger ared up in him...").
Frede draws a second sort of example from ordinary usage. When we see
14Here I am using this example to illuminate the proposed interpretation of the einai-
gignesthai distinction, not presenting a a full interpretation of Socrates' remarks on perception
at the beginning of the Theaetetus.
15Theaetetus 153d-4a.
16ek te^s prosbole^s to^n ommato^n pros te^n prose^kousan phoran phaneitai gegene^menon, 153e6-
7.
17kho^ran, 153d1.
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someone about to step on a patch of ice and say `be careful!,' we are neither
commanding him to change his character nor commanding him to exercise a
careful aspect of his character; the comment is felicitous{indeed, often more
felicitous{if it is generally known that the person is not careful. The purpose of
the remark is to prescribe a certain kind of behavior.18
Such examples suggest further motivations for PD : There are cases where
something is incapable of (really) being F in virtue of its nature, yet it is
plausible that it can \be F" in some sense. Suppose, for example, that a six-
year-old needs a painful set of shots. We might ask or tell the child to be brave in
this situation. Further suppose that one's view of moral psychology and ethical
development entails that true bravery is simply not available to this or any six-
year-old: children simply do not yet have certain capacities that are necessary
for true bravery. Nonetheless, the instruction to be brave still makes sense:
it is an instruction to muster up the psychic resources to manifest bravery or
to do what a brave person would do, and one is not lying when one praises a
six-year-old for \being brave."
Similarly, one might also consider the case of an iron nail's becoming mag-
netic after being rubbed against a powerful neodymium magnet. It is perhaps
plausible that the nail merely behaves magnetically for a while. It is capable of
a certain temporary modication to its structure that gives it magnetic proper-
ties for a while, but these inevitably fade. It is in the nature of an iron nail to,
under appropriate circumstances, take on those properties. Even more, how-
ever, it is in its nature to lose them; it is simply not structured in a way that
18That said, however, the comment does not merely prescribe behavior; it is not quite
equivalent to `do something that is careful!' or `don't slip and fall!'. Although a reckless
person is merely manifesting carefulness instead of being careful when he walks attentively
on an icy sidewalk, he still counts as careful in that derivative sense as he is doing so, in
a way that would not be true if (for example) a snowstorm prevented him from drinking
and driving. Although this point is less important for current purposes, the idea of \merely
manifested states" as occupying an ethical middle ground is important elsewhere (e.g., at
Lysis 217, and{much more famously{in Nicomachean Ethics II.4, where Aristotle says that
one comes to be just by behaving as a just person does).
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allows it to have such properties stably. Whereas it might be plausible to say
that the neodymium magnet really is a magnet, the iron nail can merely become
magnetic or serve as a magnet.
One might or might not nd any of these motivations for accepting PD
compelling, either in the context of the Protagoras or more generally. I return to
this subject below; for now, simply note that Frede appeals to such intuitions in
developing his reading of the Protagoras, which reading involves a commitment
to PD.
Alan Code provides an early and representative example of the other side of
this debate: he held, against Frede, that gignesthai F in the Protagoras (and in
Plato more generally) simply means \coming to be F,"19 which in turn seems to
mean \being generated F -wise" or \being engaged in a process that terminates
in being F."20
On Code's reading of gignesthai, Socrates attributes to Pittacus this view:
Going through the process that ends in being good is hard, but once one is good
(having nished that process), it is easy to stay good. On this view, goodness is
something like enrollment in an elite university: the process of getting in is long
and highly selective, so that most people do not complete the process. Staying
in once admitted, however, is straightforward.
This view gives a familiar and easily understood reading for gignesthai, and
it leaves Pittacus saying something interesting and intelligible: the path up the
mountain, so to speak, is hard, and hanging out on top of the mountain is
easy. That this interpretation is so readily understood is a mark in its favor.
19[Code, 1988, pgs. 59-60].
20It is not entirely clear what Code means by `coming to be F.' He says (i) that he prefers
a view according to which it is `resembl[ing] imperfectly that which is really F' (p. 55); (ii)
that the `realm of becoming' may be importantly characterized by `constant and continual
generation and destruction' (p. 54); and that (iii) Frede's conjecture about the meaning of
gignesthai cannot be right. Note that remark (i) might suggest a view rather close to Frede's
after all; the remarks summarized in (ii), however, suggest the reading I give above, which
also does justice to Code's various suggestions that a familiar English sense of \becoming" is
adequate to the job of interpreting gignesthai in the Protagoras.
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Moreover, Code reminds us that a more exotic reading of gignesthai requires one
not only to justify that reading of gignesthai but also similarly exotic readings of
of diamenein (\persist") and diatelein (\continue [to be good]"). If gignesthai,
at Prot. 344b-c, is not something that terminates in being, then diamenein
in some state does not entail being in that state, and neither does diatelein
that state. As Code thinks that \in order to remain in that condition it is
necessary that we rst be in that condition,"21 this is (according to him) reason
to abandon the exotic view of gignesthai.
Besides these arguments from plausibility and from making sense of di-
amenein and diatelein, Code oers other reasons to prefer his reading. He
holds that Frede is not justied in claiming that non-Platonic Greek uses of
gignesthai [F ] support a PD-type reading. Although this established use of
gignesthai does appear to mean something like `display F -ish features,' it does
not meet an essential constraint that Frede (according to Code) needs to place
on becoming: This usage does not, whereas Frede's proposal for gignesthai does,
presuppose or entail that gignesthai F excludes einai F. That is, Frede (accord-
ing to Code) would have it that something cannot simultaneously become and
be F, which removes any support he might have drawn from Thucydides (et
al.), whose apparently related uses of gignesthai are such that something can
simultaneously be and become F.
Finally, Code holds that Frede is insuciently attentive to Plato's views
about change, and that the ubiquity of change (and therefore coming-to-be) in
the material realm explains quite readily what Frede goes to exotic lengths to
explain by other means. Once we recognize just how much coming-to-be there is
among participants, we should nd no need for another reading of gignesthai.22
On the strength of these arguments, many have taken Code to have par-
21Ibid., p. 59; emphasis original.
22Ibid., pg. 54.
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ried what they see as an undermotivated and implausible reading of Platonic
metaphysics. Indeed, perhaps Code did so.23 I will hold, however, that even if
Code is correct about Socrates' considered view of gignesthai, the interpretation
of Socrates' rst, joking remarks about gignesthai require something like PD.
That is, we might notice that even if Code's view is correct as a view about
Socrates' later, less joking explanation of gignesthai, we still need to explain the
rst, joking explanation, and at least this explanation requires PD.
For present purposes, Code's most relevant objection{the one that most
threatens the possibility of a PD-type reading of being and becoming in the
Protagoras, as opposed to its being Socrates' considered conclusion{to Frede is
as follows: He claims that the uses of gignesthai that Frede uses to support his
view are not exclusive, whereas Frede's proposed sense of gignesthai is exclusive.
By exclusive Code means that for something to gignesthai F entails that it
cannot einai F. This objection can be answered in a few ways. First, it is not
clear that Frede is committed to the view that gignesthai is in fact exclusive.
In [Frede, 1988], at least, there is nothing that so commits him (as far as I can
tell). Indeed, he briey discusses a closely related question24 and there seems
to be agnostic.
More certainly, there is little in Frede's analysis of gignesthai that would
entail that{whatever Frede himself might have thought{any Frede-type analy-
sis of gignesthai must be an exclusive one. A second response to Code here
would question the ways in which an analysis of gignesthai must be continuous
with Thucydidean or other uses of the verb. An appeal to non-Platonic texts
to establish a possible sense of a verb is often most signicant insofar as it es-
23For an argument that he did not, see [Mann, 2000, p. 95 .]
24[Frede, 1988, p. 50]. Here Frede asks: \Why should we not say that Socrates has such a
nature as to have the marks of a human being and hence really is a man?" He appeals to the
Timaeus to motivate the view that there is nothing about that material, destructible Socrates
to explain why he should be a human being by nature; he also, however, suggests that there
\was some wavering on Plato's part" on this question.
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tablishes the possibility of a meaning or the possibility that a way of thinking
would have been familiar to Plato. Most parties to this debate, including Code,
hold that Plato's gignesthai is something like a technical term, which Plato
and his characters go to great lengths to elaborate, and which they recognize
as unfamiliar or surprising in some ways (see, e.g., Theaet. 152c .). Indeed,
Code's own preferred view, that of becoming as coming-to-be, should probably
be characterized as exclusive, and thus fails to meet this standard of continuity
with Thucydidean and related usage. While it is fair to note that becoming-as-
displaying-marks, as sometimes elaborated, might not exactly match all non-
Platonic uses of gignesthai, this objection ultimately gives little reason to hold
that a Frede-type reading of gignesthai, according to which gignesthai and einai
mark two dierent kinds of predication, is something that Plato could not have
intended even in Socrates' rst remarks.
Among Code's objections, only this one entails not only that Socrates could
not have been using a PD-involving distinction throughout the poetry-interpretation
passage, but also that Socrates could not have used one even in the rst portion
of the scene. Moreover, any claim that \gignesthai" consistently means \coming
to be" does not make dramatic sense of the full scene. When Protagoras proudly
springs his trap at 339c-d, the audience, along with Socrates himself, takes this
to be a decisive blow. Even if Socrates' self-report at this stage has an element
of irony, the scene does not make sense if there is not a genuine diculty that
Protagoras has raised by suggesting that Simonides has contradicted himself.
But it is hard to see how Protagoras could have thought his objection to be
damning, and how a careful and thoughtful audience could have agreed with
him, if \agathon genesthai" could have meant only \come to be good." The
force with which Protagoras' objection strikes the crowd is inexplicable unless
\agathon genesthai" can mean something other than \come to be good," and
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indeed something that is fairly easy to confuse with \be good."
Moreover, a view of becoming as coming-to-be entails that, on Socrates' view
of Simonides' poem, it is not in fact impossible to be good;25 there is no sign in
the dialogue,26 however, that Socrates revises what he attributes to Pittacus at
344e, which is that it is impossible to be good.27
For these reasons, it seems to me that a PD-involving view of becoming is
required at least by the rst portion of this Protagoras scene. Further challenges
could be raised against such a view, however. I will discuss two of them next.28
According to a rst objection, one might think that one could treat \einai
F" and \gignesthai F" as indicating predication, but as predication of dierent
predicates; the dierence could be packed into the predicate as opposed to the
copula. Thus, for example, \becoming good" could be paraphrased as \being
good-resembling" or \being pretty good" or \being ready to ght in war."
Textual evidence weighs heavily against this suggestion, however. First,
when Socrates rst presents the distinction between being and becoming, he says
at least twice not that being-something is dierent from becoming-something
but rather than being, full stop (to einai), is dierent from becoming, full
stop (to genesthai).29 Moreover, the passage includes a substantial speech that
disambiguates \bad,"30 but gives no suggestion that \good" is to be disam-
biguated. Indeed, Socrates at 343d-e explicitly dismisses the suggestion that
25See [Code, 1988, p. 59]: \Hence Socrates is not claiming that it is impossible to be good."
26I say \in the dialogue" because I am making a claim about the conversation between
Socrates and Protagoras: specically, that Code's view would require that Socrates{in this
conversation, not as a matter of overall Socratic philosophy{hold or be committed to the view
that, according to Pittacus, it is not impossible to be good. Socrates, however, asserts at
344e, with apparent sincerity and without later revising the assertion, that Pittacus holds
that it is impossible to be good. Whether Plato's Socrates or the historical Socrates would
have endorsed this claim, and whether it can be made consistent with the picture of virtue
we nd in the Republic or elsewhere, are other questions.
27This point, along with a more technical objection having to do with the order of the
innitives diamenein and diatelein at 344b-c, can be found at [Mann, 2000, p. 96].
28Karen Bennett suggested these objections.
29Prot. 340c-d.
30340e-341c.
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\truly" is meant to modify \good," so as for the poem to distinguish what is
truly good from what is good but not truly good. Thus we should expect that
if the problem were to be solved by disambiguating predicates, Socrates could
not have failed to do so for gignesthai when he did so carefully in other cases.
Moreover, elsewhere in the dialogues,31 we nd suggestions that becoming F
really is a matter of being somehow related to F and not some other predicate.
In the discussion of whiteness at Theaetetus 152, for example, it is clear that
becoming white is what happens precisely because items cannot be white. It is
not the case that there on the one hand really are some (perceptible, ordinary)
white items while on the other hand some items really are some other, white-ish
feature and are thereby said to become white. In the context of that passage,
when we mistakenly say that snow is white, the mistake we are making is not
that of attributing the wrong feature to the snow; otherwise, the elaborate
analysis of whiteness (which is never presented as an analysis of anything other
than whiteness) would be out of place. The mistake we make, rather, is that
of attributing something that arises between an object and a perceiver to the
object itself; it is the mistake of attributing place to something that does not
have place; and so on.
For these reasons, and because Plato nowhere to my knowledge attempts
to explain the dierence between being and becoming in terms of a change
in predicate in this way, I conclude that a Frede-type view is after all best
understood as involving two kinds of predication.
According to a second objection, the dierence between being and becoming
could be explained in terms of being essentially as opposed to being accidentally,
or being necessarily as opposed to being contingently, or being permanently as
31It is, of course, possible that dierent views of being and becoming are found at dierent
places in the dialogues (see the Introduction); this evidence is presented only to motivate the
thought that becoming F really is a way of bearing some relation to F and not to some related
predicate.
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opposed to being temporarily. We might call this the \larceny strategy," as it
attempts to relate becoming to being in roughly the way that grand larceny
is related to larceny: by the addition of some further qualier.32 Just as the
existence of being-in-Mexico and being-in-Canada does not entail that there are
two kinds of being, neither does the existence of being accidentally and being
essentially, being temporarily and being permanently, and so on.
It seems unlikely, however, that any such reduction of becoming to being in
this way can make sense of the evidence in the dialogues. The famous Phaedo
passage about re, snow, The Hot, and The Cold might make one particularly
skeptical of such a strategy. There,33 it is said that snow cannot \admit" (dexa-
mene^n) heat without being destroyed, and similarly that re cannot ever admit
coldness. It thus seems that re, for example, is essentially and necessarily hot.
Yet the relationship between re and The Hot must, if analyzed according to
the technical distinction between becoming and being, be that of becoming as
opposed to being.
Again, Theaetetus 152 provides a more direct sort of evidence against such
a reading. There Socrates is emphatic that becoming simply is not a form of
being, and that in cases of becoming, one is tempted to speak of being either
because one is making a metaphysical mistake or because one is constrained by
a language that is not always apt for expressing the dierence between becoming
and being. At least in the Phaedo and Theaetetus, then, becoming F cannot be
analyzed as being F essentially, being F permanently, or anything of the sort.
32I use this example in the Introduction.
33Phaedo 103d-e.
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3.3 Is a distinction between kinds of predication
intuitively plausible?
Discussions of einai in Plato often begin by supposing that we have strong prima
facie reason not to attribute views involving several kinds of predication to Plato
(even as a view that Plato countenances but does not believe or arm). This
supposition often seems to arise from the belief that there really are not, as a
matter of philosophical fact, several kinds of predication, and that this fact was
probably clear to Plato. Relatedly, commentators frequently seem to suppose
that we understand pretty well the dierent uses of the English \is," and that
these uses are so well-dened, distinct, and obvious34 that we have strong reason
to think that Plato's einai has corresponding uses, insofar as he was in touch
with the philosophical facts that underlie the behavior of the English verb.35
Because such assumptions at least sometimes play such an important role in
motivating certain views of Platonic metaphysics, it is worth examining them
on their own terms. In the next subsection, I suggest that the identifying and
predicational uses of \is" are not as easily distinguished as we often take them
to be. In the subsection after that, I suggest that there is something like the dis-
tinction between einai and gignesthai in modern English (among other modern
languages), although this distinction can be obscured by the fact that both sides
34Note that, even among those who believe it obvious what the dierent uses of \is" are,
there remains disagreement about what those dierent uses are. So, for example, whereas
many commentators list the existential, predicative, and identifying uses, Timothy Gow-
ers lists (what we might call) identifying, predicative, and exemplifying uses{though many
philosophers would classify each of the the three corresponding examples Gowers gives as
standard predications. For these examples and for Gowers' discussion more generally, see
section I.2.2 of [Gowers et al., 2008].
35Such assumptions operate, for example, in a diagnosis of Vlastos of a \syntactical ambi-
guity" in the use of \is," which he says can be a copula or an \identity-sign."[Vlastos, 1981, p.
76] Elsewhere Vlastos says that \even a Greek child" would have known the dierence, in prac-
tice, between existential and predicative uses of `is' ([Vlastos, 1965, pg. 9]). (I am indebted to
Lesley Brown's reference to and discussion of this passage of Vlastos's; see [Brown, 1999, p.
461-2].) See [Rosenthal, 2011, p. 155] for another example of a commentator taking common
sense to weigh strongly against a view that posits a distinction in kinds of predication.
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of the distinction use the same English verb (to be). Here I go farther than some
other commentators have by suggesting that there is also an analogous distinc-
tion in the English \know;" I will claim that there exists an epistemic side of
the distinction, so to speak, which is also observed and distinguished in English.
3.3.1 Is there a clear distinction between identifying and
predicational uses of \is"? (Perhaps not.)
Commentators often begin discussions of the Greek copula by distinguishing
identifying and predicational senses of `einai ' in Plato and claiming that these
correspond to a distinction we would readily recognize between predication and
identication. This, in turn, is often justied, implicitly or explicitly, by the
claim that there are sharply distinguished identifying and predicational senses
of `is' in English, and that the distinction between predication and identication
is similarly sharp and non-problematic. The idea seems often to be that it is
easy to distinguish identity and predication, and consequently identifying and
predicational uses of `is,' and therefore that we should assume that Plato had
those sharply distinguished senses of einai.
If such a line of reasoning supports traditional views about Plato's use of
einai, it is relevant here to examine its assumptions, and specically the as-
sumption that we have a sharp and accurate distinction between identity and
predication. The less sharp and accurate our distinction turns out to be, the
weaker prima facie reason we have to attribute it or an analogue of it to Plato.
I suspect that the (`pre-theoretical' or `non-historical') distinction between
identity and predication is far less clear than commentators on Plato usually
assume it to be. I will begin with mathematical examples because they might
seem at rst to provide the clearest possible cases of identity or predication
statements. By showing the distinction between identity and predication to be
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problematic, or at least fuzzy, even in the case of mathematics, I hope to argue
that it is problematic and fuzzy in general. Here, then, is a list of cases of
being-F that might be thought to problematize the distinction between identity
and predication.
Being 5 mod 691
Barry Mazur has asked us to consider what sort of thing 5 mod 691 is.36 It can
plausibly be taken to refer37 to:
1. An object in a dierent number system that happens to share symbols
with the one we learn in elementary school;
2. An equivalence class of the objects in the number system we learn about
in elementary school; or
3. An object in the number system we learn about in elementary school, but
with a reminder that a certain equivalence relation is relevant.
Because this ambiguity (if it is an ambiguity) exists, a statement like \5
= 696 mod 691," or one of its notational variants, is not easily classied as
either an identity or a predication: it is not clear whether a property is being
attributed to 5 or whether 5 is being identied with some other object. On the
second alternative above, it seems like an identity, as \5" and \696" both pick
out the same equivalence class. On the rst alternative, the sentence is also
natural to classify as an identity, as \5" and \696" can be construed as names
of the same object. On the third alternative, however, it is more natural to
36This example comes from [Mazur, 2007].
37Here I speak of \referring to" mathematical objects, which implicitly takes a position on
debates concerning the metaphysical status of mathematical objects. Questions about how to
choose between the three options I present here are orthogonal to most traditional questions
about the status of mathematicals (e.g., whether one prefers some sort of ctionalism, a
Balauger-style \full-blooded Platonism," or something else). If it is metaphysically legitimate
to do abstract algebra, these three options all make sense and are dierent.
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think of this as a predication{that is, a claim that 5 has the property of being
congruent to 696 modulo 691.
Here one might object that the sentence is simply ambiguous between an
identity statement and a predication. But this would come as a surprise to
competent arithemeticians, who are very likely simply to consider \5 = 696
mod 691" as a true statement, and not as an ambiguous sentence that might
indicate any of several true states of aairs. If one writes that down as the
rst line of a proof, one is never asked to disambiguate it or accused of a lack
of clarity; one often reasons about such claims independently of, and without
considering, questions about the domain of numbers involved.
Moreover, this situation is not rare in mathematics. Sentences that are
ambiguous in this way between being (what one might call) identities and (what
one might call) predications are common. (When a fully respectable algebra
textbook tells us, for example, that \2 = 0 in a eld of characteristic 2,"38 we
certainly don't conclude that elds of characteristic 2 also have characteristic 0,
and we don't revise our beliefs about how to do ordinary arithmetic in \the real
world;" it is a lot easier to take the lesson about doing arithmetic with (e.g.)
polynomials over F2 than it is to gure out precisely what \2=0" means here.)
39
The next example is similar to these.
Being
p
2
We can take powers of
p
2 without saying whether we are treating
p
2 as a
symbol for a certain positive root of 2 or as a description of any element of a eld
that when multiplied by itself yields 2. Perhaps one is working in the domain of
38[Dummit and Foote, 1999, p. 494]
39See also the \Warning" to the reader at [Lang, 2001, p. 243-4]; there, one is advised to use
a notation for nth roots that does not suggest such roots are unique. Note also that one is not
warned against manipulating such (possibly non-unique) roots as one would manipulate any
other variable; when we make such manipulations, are we learning something about object
underlying the variable, or are we learning about what follows whenever a certain description
applies to an object?
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natural numbers and is, purely algebraically, considering the properties of some
eld containing an x such that x2   2 = 0; alternatively, one could be working
in the domain of the real numbers, where there are \already" two numbers such
that x2   2 = 0, and using \p2" as a symbol for the positive one.
Much mathematical discourse proceeds without any explicit disambiguation
of this situation; arguably, there is often simply no fact of the matter how this
is to be \disambiguated," and indeed arguably this is not a case of ambiguity
at all. Analogously, when one is doing \clock arithmetic" (\it's 5 o'clock, so in
71 hours, it will be 4 o'clock"), there is arguably no fact of the matter which
of the various three above interpretations of 5 mod 12 is applicable to one's
thought. As a result, it is not clear whether we are proving identity statements
involving a certain familiar irrational number, whether we are ascribing certain
predicates to items (e.g., that 4 has the property of being the fourth power of
p
2), or whether we are proving things about items that bear certain properties
(e.g., that anything that is a square root of 2 is also a fourth root of 4).
Being Pegasus
Quine famously suggested \X pegasizes" as an acceptable paraphrase of \X is
Pegasus."40 His interest was in the semantics of proper names, and in particular
their existential import; one purpose of this substitution is to remove the appar-
ent existential import of \X is Pegasus." This move also, however, replaces an
identity statement with a predication. On this view, to say that Deep Throat is
Mark Felt is just to say that Deep Throat is what markfelts (where \markfelt"
is a verb that, as Quine says, expresses an \irreducible attribute"), and that
nothing else markfelts.
Now, Quine was attempting to explain the semantics of proper names and to
address the problem of referring to (presumably) nonexistent items. That said,
40[Quine, 1948]
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his solution is one of glossing identity claims by means of predicational claims.
Moreover, these predications are intended not only to entail identity claims but
to paraphrase them. Were it outrageous to paraphrase identity claims by means
of predicational ones, Quine's view and its various Russellian cousins might have
enjoyed less popularity than they in fact did and do.
There are, of course, other explanations of this popularity than its being in
general unclear how to distinguish identity from predication; in this respect the
mathematical examples are clearer, and the reader can ignore this one if she
prefers.
3.3.2 Is a distinction in kinds of predication so foreign to
us? (Perhaps not.)
Commentators (including Code, in places41) often write as if common sense
weighs strongly against there being a distinction in kinds of predication{that
is, that we have no very good reason to think that a distinction such as Frede
draws is metaphysically helpful, and therefore that we have strong reason to
resist attributing such a distinction to Plato.42 Because this sort of appeal
to intuition or common sense is common, it is worth assessing whether such
intuition or common sense is really so decisive as is assumed. I will suggest that
it is not.
First, ordinary English usage sometimes suggests something very like Frede's
distinction; some such uses (e.g., \Be careful!" and \He is being brave") were
discussed above.43 Second, in Romance languages other than English, these
dierent (I claim) uses are in fact marked by dierent words, as with Spanish
41See [Code, 1988, section 4].
42Some version of this has frequently been suggested to me in conversation about this
subject.
43To take just one example \from the wild," consider this comment made by a manager of
a baseball team: \I'm a rm believer that if you want to be it, you have to be it before you
are it."[Kepner, 2013]
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ser and estar.44
There is a lively debate about the precise patterns that ser and estar obey,
but all interpretations begin from the phenomena that certainly make it appear
as if estar is used with `temporary' or `accidental' features of an item, whereas
ser is used for `permanent' or `essential' features of an item.45 This is not to
say that the distinction between bearing a property essentially and bearing it
accidentally, nor that between bearing a property temporarily and bearing it
permanently, is the same as that between merely manifesting a feature and hav-
ing it as a matter of character. The distinction in Spanish does, however, very
roughly track the sense of the being/becoming distinction (as a predicational
distinction), and the fact that any such distinction is marked in the Spanish
copula(s) is notable.
Attributing a feature to someone as a stable aspect of her character leads
one to use \ser," but \estar" is appropriate if one is describing one's temporary
behavior. \Ser" is appropriate when describing the way a food tastes, if that
taste is characteristic of the kind of food in question (as with a strawberry's
sweetness); \estar" is appropriate, however, when describing the taste of a food
as prepared a certain way or as a result of its being overripe. Although there
is dispute about whether such a distinction in kinds of attributes (whether it
be a distinction between accidental and essential or that between temporary
and permanent) is in fact appropriate as an explanation of the distinction be-
tween \ser" and \estar," it is telling that the phenomena make such distinctions
tempting.
Moreover, attempts to explain the ser / estar distinction without something
at least roughly like the being/becoming distinction often admit of strong coun-
44As Frede points out: see [Frede, 1988, pgs. 45-6].
45That the basic usage patterns at least suggest such an interpretation is accepted even by
scholars who go on to suggest views according to which the ser/estar distinction has nothing
to do with a distinction in kinds of properties or features; see, e.g., [Maienborn, 2005, p. 156].
One statement of the standard view appears in [Kumo and Wongkhomthong, 1981, p. 101].
74
terarguments. Maienborn, for example, holds that \any explanation ... that
relies somehow on a division of the adjectives into two conceptual categories
is essentially wrong and cannot be rescued,"46 but this contention rests on the
observation that either ser or estar is appropriate in situations when one cannot
know whether a property is essential or accidental (or whether it is temporary
or permanent). So, in the central example, one may use estar to describe the
color exhibited by the leaves of a newly-discovered tree before one knows the
stable or long-term appearance of the tree.
Maienborn's example47 is valuable, but it does not support such an extreme
conclusion. Other less extreme interpretations are consistent with the example.
It may be that things that essentially or stably have certain features may also
(temporarily) exhibit such features in such a way that would support the use
of \estar."48 Alternatively, it may be that ignorance of a thing's nature might
be a reason to speak of features as temporary/accidental even if they might
actually be permanent/essential. Thus we can explain Maienborn's 9'(b), \Los
hojas de este arbol estan amarillas," as saying that the leaves are manifesting
yellow-ness{whether or not they really are yellow as a matter of the nature
of the species.49 In this way, nding a case in which one can appropriately
use either ser or estar does not establish that the distinction does not suggest
dierent ways in which an item can be related to its properties. It does show
that there is no exclusive and exhaustive distinction among adjectives, or even
between noun-adjective-context combinations, such that one group takes estar
and the other ser ; but this is not enough to reject the view that the linguistic
46[Maienborn, 2005, p. 159].
47The example is due to [Querido, 1976], but the conclusions drawn from it are Maienborn's.
48In the terminology of the Code / Frede debate, discussed below, Maienborn's conclusion
does not follow if we do not assume that the use of \ser" in question is exclusive.
49As a dierent alternative, it might be that Maienborn's (contextual) account of \ser" and
\estar" tracks the felicitous usage of those verbs, but that underlying many of those felicitous
usages is the correct recognition that things really are related to their features in two dierent
ways.
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distinction can be viewed as expressing a distinction in the ways things are
related to features.
If a distinction very much like the one proposed for einai and gignesthai is,
in other languages, not only present but marked o with the use of dierent
words{even if the correspondence is only approximate, and even if the words
in question are also used to track other, purely epistemic, distinctions{we have
even stronger reason to believe that the distinction is minimally sensible, and
indeed that it might suggest something of metaphysical importance.
Moreover, other verbs (or related sets of verbs) follow the same pattern,
where one of the pair denotes a high-standards success-state, and the other de-
notes a related but fundamentally dierent state having to do with the tempo-
rary, supercial, and/or imperfect features related to those of the high-standards
state. Consider the contemporary English to know in two of its uses. The rst is
the sense most commonly studied (at least in approximation) by philosophers:
that is, the achievement of a privileged (and, under most views, dicult and
noble) epistemic state. I will argue, however, that there is another interesting
sense of \to know," and that the contrast between these two senses of the verb
provides something like an \epistemic side" to the contrast between being and
becoming, or the contrast between the two English senses of \to be" described
above.
Consider such comments as one might hear after a person passes away: e.g.,
\I knew him to be gentle." I will claim that the \know [F ]" here means, roughly,
\be acquainted with a thing's displaying the marks of F -ness." This sense of
know corresponds to sense III.11.e.(b) in the Oxford English Dictionary: \In
perfect tenses: to have had perception or experience of as a contemporary fact."
The OED supports this sense by such references as [Irving, 1824, II., 35]: \I ...
have known Hamlet to stalk solemnly on to deliver his soliloquy, with a dishclout
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pinned to his skirts."
We are in general in a better position to felicitously speak of having known a
person to be F if we have not been in a position to know the person intimately:
such remarks usually gesture at a supercial and/or occasional acquaintance
with the subject.50 Were it not a violation of Gricean norms, it would be
perfectly sensible to say \I didn't really know him, but I always knew him to be
gentle." Moreover, such a sentence would usually be a violation of Gricean norms
precisely because the second use of \to know" is a sense in which knowing X [to
be F ] does not entail knowing X [simpliciter]; it is therefore usually unnecessary
to add \I didn't really know him."51
This specialized sense of to know is, I think, roughly analogous to the be
in \be careful!." Knowing, in this sense, is a sort of interaction with or grasp
of temporary, limited, and external features of the object known; it is an ac-
quaintance with the object as it manifested itself in narrowly circumscribed
situations. Interestingly, there is a rough correspondence between those circum-
stances in which it is appropriate to speak of \having known X to be F" and
those in which it is appropriate, on something like a Fredean view, to speak of
X 's having become F (in the technical sense). One might, that is, think that
to say that I have known someone to be F is to say that one has experience
50This is not to say that it is always infelicitous to say, about someone one knows well, that
one has known him to be F. Similarly, however, items that really are F also display the marks
of F -ness. Suppose someone accused a good friend of being disloyal; suppose further that I
both know this friend's (loyal) character intimately and have also seen many instances of his
displaying loyalty. It seems to me that I could respond either by saying \I know that he is
loyal" and \I have known him to be loyal." If asked for evidence for the former claim, it would
be natural to cite evidence about our intimate friendship and about his character in general
terms (perhaps he has written eloquently about loyalty in a way that evidences a profound
sensitivity to the subject, or he underwent a long regimen of military training of the sort that
is intended to shape one's character in certain ways). If asked for evidence of the latter claim,
it would be natural to cite evidence about specic loyal acts that he has performed.
51In the proposed sentence, there is perhaps a further slight infelicity caused by uttering
\I didn't really know him" and \I knew him [to be F ]" in the same context. This is not,
however, a sign that I am misunderstanding the functions of the English to know. It is
generally jarring to hear the same form of words negated and not negated without a change of
context, regardless of whether the form of words has the same meaning when it is and is not
negated. (\I'm not going to the bank; I'm going to the bank" would sound similarly strange
even if one was obviously going to a Bank of America instead of the Mississippi River.)
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with the person's having displayed the marks of F -ness{if this is true, it is apt
in cases when one has experience with the person's having become F.
The value of such evidence from ordinary language is of course limited,
especially when the language in question is not Plato's Greek. That said, these
phenomena at least partially blunt arguments that rely on a strong presumption
against there being (in reality or in ordinary thought) a distinction in kinds of
predication, or against there being pairs of related verbs, one of which concerns
a decient, temporary, and/or limited version of what the other concerns.
3.4 The evidence from Greek \einai" and \gignesthai"
I now turn to some evidence (and some debates) about the Greek verbs them-
selves. I begin by surveying some familiar conclusions for which there is a strong
consensus; I hold that these conclusions are at least compatible with, and pos-
sibly serve as positive support for, PD. I then turn to a debate between Frede
and Lesley Brown on an aspect of the Greek \einai." Although that debate
primarily focuses on the Sophist, it is sometimes thought that if Brown has the
better of this debate, we will then have reason to reject Frede-type views of
einai and gignesthai more broadly (and with them anything like PD). As an
indirect defense of PD, then, I will argue that Brown's position in this debate
is not as strong as it is sometimes taken to be.
Charles H. Kahn has contributed a rich body of work on \einai" and \gignesthai,"
and much of this work derives from his taking up the question whether and how
the distinction between existence and predication, which is \so well established
in our own thought," shows up Plato.52 Kahn problematized the importation
of this distinction into Greek texts by arguing, over the years, for a large set of
claims, including these:
52[Kahn, 1966, p. 18]
78
1. There is no distinct sense of the verb einai that corresponds to the English
\to exist."[Kahn, 1966, p. 20 .]
2. Einai generally has durative connotations, and relatedly, being has an
\intrisically stable and lasting character ... in Greek;" gignesthai, by con-
trast, \expresses the developmental idea of birth, of achieving a new state,
of emerging as novelty or as event."[Kahn, 1966, p. 29]
3. Describing the sense of einai in a given Platonic passage requires us to in-
voke, in the general case, meanings that cut across or combine our familiar
distinctions between the predicative, identifying, veridical, and existential
uses of `is.'53
None of these claims entails that there are no Platonic uses of einai that can
be described, without distortion, as doing what we would do in English with
an identifying or predicative use of `is' (if it is correct to describe uses of `is'
that way). The rst and third of these claims, however, strongly support the
view that we are not entitled, a priori, to suppose that any given Platonic use
of einai should have some single use that corresponds to a single use that we
believe the English `is' to have.54
Kahn asked us to reconsider our assumptions about the relationship between
(what we would call) existence and uses of einai in which the verb has no
complement. Thus reconsidering these assumptions might motivate a view of
being and becoming along the lines described above, or at least might reduce
the motivation to reject such a view out of hand.
53Such claims occur frequently in [Kahn, 1966] and [Kahn, 1981]; particularly notable are
the four detailed examples at [Kahn, 1981, pgs. 78-90]
54An early remark of Kahn's expresses the point vividly:
I have seen exegetes furrowing their brow over the question whether Plato in
a given passage of the Sophist means us to take einai in the existential or
copulative sense, whereas in fact he shows no sign of wishing to confront us with
any such choice.[Kahn, 1966, p. 20]
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Lesley Brown further called into question our understanding of such ap-
pearances of einai in a landmark study of the Sophist.55 Brown and Kahn both
argue that \syntactically complete" (to use Brown's phrase) uses of einai do not
always carry the meaning \exists," so that X esti need not mean \X exists."56
Although in this respect it is compatible with (and even supports) PD, aspects
of her views have been taken as evidence against readings of Plato involving
PD. I turn to these views now.
3.4.1 Lesley Brown's challenge
Brown's work has been taken to be a challenge to Frede-type views about einai
and gignesthai quite generally. In a series of papers, she has laid out a view
that she takes to be a superior alternative to Frede's as a reading of the Sophist ;
such a view might seem to threaten broader conclusions, such as a predicational
reading of einai and gignesthai in the Protagoras and elsewhere.
Brown's argument, as it is laid out in [Brown, 1999], relies on something like
an appeal to the best explanation: she holds that what Frede explains with a
distinction in predication is better explained by noticing that verbs can exhibit
variable polyadicity and that einai is such a verb.
The arity of a mathematical function is the number of arguments it takes.
By analogy (or as a special case, if one views verbs as mathematical functions57),
the number of arguments a verb takes is described with this vocabulary. A verb
that can take a variable number of arguments is thus called variably polyadic.
Brown holds that variable polyadicity exists.58 Considering verbs such as
\writing" makes this quite plausible. Both \Alex is writing" and \Alex is writing
55[Brown, 1999]
56Indeed, Kahn would suggest that Greek philosophy did not address the concept that we
would invoke with such a sentence.[Kahn, 2008, p. 4]
57See, e.g., the Fregean research program laid out in [Heim and Kratzer, 1998].
58This is not uncontroversial; the problem is discussed at length in [Davidson, 2006], and a
proposal on which there is no such phenomenon is discussed at [Davidson, 2006, p. 46].
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a letter" are felicitous English sentences. Most of us would not say that dierent
verbs are used in the two sentences, nor that \Alex is writing" is elliptical for
\Alex is writing something," even if we believe that \Alex is writing" entails
the truth of \Alex is writing something."59
Recognizing and emphasizing that such verbs exist, including in Plato's
Greek, has paved the way for major advancements in our understanding of
Plato. It is, for example, an essential element of the resolution of a long-standing
dispute about Apology 30, where Socrates says:
ouk ek khre^mato^n arete^ gignetai, all' ex arete^s khre^mata kai ta alla
agatha tois anthro^pois hapanta kai idiai kai de^mosiai.
This sentence can (and should) be translated: \Virtue does not come from
money, but from virtue money and everything everything else becomes good for
people, both in public and in private."60 This translation, however, requires that
we supply gignetai again after the comma, with agatha tois anthropois (\good
for humans") as a complement. As gignetai does not have a complement in its
explicit appearance, some have objected to this translation.61
59Brown is not always clear about whether she thinks that in the case of verbs of variable
polyadicity generally, or einai specically, it is true that what she calls a \C2 complete use"
is one that entails the truth of some corresponding sentence with a complement. What she
says in [Brown, 1999, section 3] is agnostic on this question, but she may be thought to invoke
such a principle when she says that the negation of the incomplete esti \is equivalent to `is
not anything at all;"' this inference seems to rest on her claim that the incomplete esti is a
\C2 complete" use.
It seems to me false that such an entailment holds in general. Consider the verb \hacking."
This is, I submit, a verb of variable polyadicity. One can felicitously say that \Alex is hacking,"
\Alex is hacking a 1969 Ford," \Alex is hacking a 1969 Ford so that it orders a pizza when
you engage the parking brake," and so on. Yet \Alex is hacking" does not entail that there
is something that Alex is hacking. One might object that these are two dierent verbs, one
of which means something like \to exercise one's technological, esp. computer programming,
skills" and the other of which means something like \to modify, esp. with technological
ingenuity." But I would argue that the verb does not change meaning in this way; rather, one
is sometimes and only sometimes, while hacking, hacking something. (Consider also playing.
We say that children are \playing" when they are playing hopscotch or chess, but also when
they are running around and merely \seeing what there is to see"{that is, when there is
nothing that they are playing.)
60For a thorough discussion of the history of this line's translation, see [Burnyeat, 2003,
pgs. 1-3].
61De Strycker and Slings hold \that gignetai should in both [antithetical] members
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If we understand Brown's point about the variable polyadicity of verbs,
however, this behavior of gignetai does not entail that Socrates or Plato was
engaging, improbably, in a convoluted bit of zeugma here. We can give the
same meaning to gignetai in \ouk ek khre^mato^n arete^ gignetai" (\virtue does
not come from money") and in \ex arete^s khre^mata kai ta alla agatha [gignetai]"
(\from virtue money and everything else [becomes] good").62
Brown's point about the variable polyadicity of verbs, and especially verbs
used for predication in Plato's Greek, is, then, not only intuitive but also es-
sential to understanding Platonic texts properly. She thinks that it also un-
dermines the motivation for adopting an interpretation such as Frede prefers
between predication auta kath' auta and predication pros heteron at Sophist
255,63 where it is said:
to^n onto^n ta men auta kath' auta, ta de pros alla aei legesthai.
Among things [onta], some are said themselves by themselves, whereas
others are always said in relation to others.
Brown holds that this distinction can be taken to be one between complete
and incomplete uses of esti, where the complete uses are \C2 complete"{that is,
they permit but do not require a complement. Brown holds that the point of
the sentence above is that sometimes things can simply be said to be, as when
we say that \change is,"64 whereas other cases of being involve uses of is that
require a complement, as when we must complete \change is dierent" with, for
example, \...from rest."
Frede, however, holds that this distinction is between predications{including
self-predications{that are true of an item \in itself" or \of itself" and those that
mean `comes from,"' and that the translation above cannot meet that requirement. See
[de Stryker and Slings, 1994, p. 334, n. 2] and [Burnyeat, 2003, p. 3].
62This is merely a statement of the view; for a full defense of it, see again [Burnyeat, 2003].
63See [Frede, 1992]; for Brown's discussion, see [Brown, 1999, pgs. 475-477].
64For this example, see [Brown, 1999, p. 475].
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are ordinary predications. So, for example, \The Beautiful is beautiful" and
\white is a color" are auto kath' auto predications, as they state predications
that are true in virtue of the nature of a Form, whereas \the White House is
white" is an ordinary or pros allo predication, as it states a relationship between
an ordinary material object and whiteness.
Brown argues that her distinction is preferable to Frede's for several rea-
sons. First, attributing it to Plato leaves him making a \clear and correct
point."65 Second, Frede motivates his view by appealing to Plato's use of an
unexpected phrase \pros allo," which Brown takes not to be so unexpected af-
ter all. Third, Frede's view assigns an unfamiliar and unmotivated meaning to
auta kath' auta. Fourth, arguments that Plato cannot here be talking about
existence vs. predication carry no weight against Brown's own view, according
to which this passage involves \C2 complete" uses of esti, so Frede's view has
no advantage insofar as both meet the desideratum of not requiring that the
passage be discussing such a distinction.
It may be thought that these objections cast doubt on any project according
to which the einai -gignesthai distinction is a distinction in kinds of predication;
Frede's view is perhaps the best-developed theory of this type, and Brown's
challenges to these other aspects of his view are serious. One may, however,
distinguish claims made about einai in an attempt to explain these very dicult
Sophist passages specically from claims made about the verb in an attempt to
explain the distinction between being and becoming in Plato generally. It might
be considered an advantage of certain views about the Sophist that they yield
or are continuous with acceptable views about subjects like the metaphysics
of the Protagoras, and it would certainly be an advantage of a view of the
Protagoras that it also resolve dicult problems from the Sophist, but there is
no reason to demand in advance that the auta kath' auta - pros allo distinction
65[Brown, 1999, p. 475]
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from the Sophist also give a distinction between einai and gignesthai that can
resolve classic problems for any such distinction, including the problem of the
metaphysics of the Protagoras or Theaetetus.
Indeed, the grounds from which Brown launches her attack on Frede-type
readings of the Sophist distinction may be thought to add to the motivation for
reading the einai - gignesthai distinction as a predicational distinction. As I
have discussed, it is sometimes thought that we have reason to disprefer predica-
tional readings of the einai - gignesthai distinction because there simply exists
a clear, intuitive, and well-understood set of distinctions between existence and
identity, between identity and predication, and so on. Brown (correctly, in my
view) follows Kahn in denying that Plato has an \is of existence" readily avail-
able; she holds, rather, that in the (rare) cases where Plato uses einai so as
to mean something like \exists," this meaning is somehow derivative from the
predicative meaning or meanings of einai. By following Kahn in rejecting the
view that we can neatly classify Platonic uses of einai as predicative, existen-
tial, or identifying, and indeed in doubting that the meaning of the verb can
be mapped cleanly onto these meanings of the English \is," she removes some
of the motivation for rejecting a reading of the einai - gignesthai distinction as
predicational.
Even putting those concerns to one side, we may ask whether Brown is cor-
rect to diagnose Sophist 255 as distinguishing between uses of esti, or whether
there is reason to prefer, as Frede and others66 do, an alternative reading ac-
cording to which it distinguishes predications that hold in virtue of an item's
own nature from predications that hold in virtue of some relationship to an-
other item. Arguably, the former sort of reading provides indirect evidence that
a predicational reading of the einai - gignesthai distinction is unmotivated,
whereas the latter would evince some general concern of Plato's to distinguish
66See, e.g., [Meinwald, 1992].
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\stronger" from \weaker" sorts of predications.
Brown does not succeed in showing that her reading makes sense of the
passage. She holds that Plato's \clear and correct" point about uses of esti,
which is the point he is making here, allows us to conclude that being and
dierent are not the same, because only the former is said \itself by itself"
whereas the latter must always be said \in relation to another." As Brown says,
we can say that `change is,' but \any use of X is dierent must be completed,
with a reference to what X is dierent from."67
It is not clear that these claims are all \clear and correct," however. In
particular, it is not clear that \dierent" and \heteron" in fact behave as she
claims they do. It is likely that any use of \dierent" permits a complement, if
something cannot be dierent without being dierent with respect to something
else. It is essential to Brown's argument, however, that to permit a complement
is not to require a complement (this is her distinction between \C1" and \C2"
complete uses); she needs the stronger claim that these verbs require comple-
ments. When we say that \cats and dogs are dierent," this might require or
entail that they are dierent from each other, but that does not mean that the
sentence involves a suppressed complement; perhaps we are just attributing a
property to the subject \cats and dogs."
In judging Brown's claim, it is relevant that Plato uses predicates in what
we might think of as unexpectedly complete ways. In the Phaedo, for example,
we nd an inquiry into why bigger things are bigger (ta megala megala) and
why smaller things are smaller (ta elatto^ elatto^).68 In that passage, although
it is surely correct to say that a smaller item is smaller than something else, it
also seems correct to say that the smaller item really is smaller, full stop. That
is, the phrase \ta elatto^ elatto^" seems not to involve an ellipse, at least in the
67[Brown, 1999, p. 475]
68Phaedo 100e.
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Phaedo.
Even some uses of heteron in Plato may be thought to be complete uses. At
Theaet. 158e, for example, Socrates says:
We are not to understand the question to refer to something which
is the same in some respects while it is dierent in others, but to
that which is wholly dierent (all' holo^s heteron).69
Soon after that, at 159a, Socrates asks:
homoioumenon men tauton phe^somen gignesthai, anomoioumenon
de heteron;
Should we say that a likening thing becomes like, whereas an anom-
alyzing thing becomes dierent?
In either case, it would be possible to argue that these uses of heteron are in
fact elliptical. But these Platonic uses, along with the aforementioned English
uses of `dierent,' call into question the correctness and certainly the clarity of
the point that Brown takes to be \clear and correct."
Moreover, a few lines later, Socrates says that change (kine^sis) is both the
same and not the same: when we say it is the same, we are speaking of it as it
is in relation to itself (pros heaute^n), and when we say it is not the same, we are
speaking of it in its relationship with others (dia te^n koino^nian au thaterou).
Brown's reading of the auta kath' auta - pros allo distinction cannot easily be
applied to these claims about the same. The passage describes a dierence
between the objects of change's sameness and dierence; it does not describe a
dierence between one relation's needing completion or saturation by an object
and the other one's not needing such a completion.
69Trans. Levett / Burnyeat.
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Insofar as Sophist 255 . is relevant to the question whether Plato describes
distinctions between kinds of predication, then, I conclude that Brown's critique
of Frede's reading of the auta kath' auta - pros allo distinction does not give
evidence that we should abandon such readings of Plato in general, and indeed
that it does not even give evidence that we should abandon such readings of
Sophist 255 .
3.5 Conclusion: the Phaedo as a brief case study
If the preceding arguments are plausible, they collectively suggest that readers
of Plato are meant to take seriously a view of predication according to which
there are two kinds of predication, marked o (when one is using words most
carefully) with the verbs \einai" and \gignesthai." These arguments, besides
being indirect, are concerned with texts for which the relationship between their
metaphysical suggestions and Plato's considered views is unclear or disputed.
If one takes the arguments above seriously, one conclusion to draw is that
Plato intends us to take such a distinction seriously; another is that Platonic
texts consistently use a view of einai and gignesthai that is accurately inter-
preted as a distinction in kinds of predication and that makes an eective foil
for theories that Plato or Socrates actually endorses. Either way, it is relevant
whether and to what degree this view is inconsistent with others we nd in the
dialogues. It might appear that Phaedo 79a, among other passages, straightfor-
wardly contradicts such a view, and that the Phaedo view is also likelier to be
endorsed by Plato, all things considered. As a case study, then, I conclude by
very briey considering that passage.
It is true that Socrates at 79a divides onta into the visible and the invisi-
ble. Because a form of einai is being applied to sensible things, this passage
might appear to provide evidence against a view according to which there is a
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distinction between being and becoming along the lines I suggest.
The import of `onta' at 79a, however, depends on the argument that has
preceded this conclusion. Socrates and Cebes have agreed that the following dis-
tinctions are (at least) coextensional: rst, the distinction between what can be
dispersed and what cannot be dispersed; second, the distinction between what
is composite and what is not composite; third, the distinction between what is
variable and what is not variable; fourth, the \uniform"70 \realities"71 that we
give accounts of and the many particulars that merely \bear the names"72 of
those former items.
Cebes' assent to Socrates' proposal that there are two kinds of onta reads
as a conclusion or continuation of the previous conversation, in which these dis-
tinctions and the relationships between them were laid out.73 While Socrates
does use a form of einai to describe the status of the decient items, there does
not appear to be a revision of Socrates' application of aute^ he^ ousia (\being
itself") to the former items and the former items alone. Because these de-
cient items are described as onta but not as ousia or ousiai,74 and because the
argument is establishing the very deciency of these items, it is reasonable to
conclude that this passage does not commit us, when reconstructing Plato's
classic metaphysics, to ascribing full-edged being to perceptible items.
Finally, it is useful to recall that in one of the central discussions of being
and becoming, Socrates says that while it is natural, in ordinary speech, to
use forms of einai for all kinds of items, this is a way of speaking loosely, and
does not entail that those items are in the strictest sense being (or being some
70monoeides, 78d5
71Note ousia at 78d1.
72They are to^n ekeinois homo^numo^n, where the ekeinois are the \uniform" \realities."
73This is clear from the overall progress of the passage; note also that Socrates introduces
his suggestion about the two kinds of onta by saying tho^men oun...; the oun suggests that
this is continuing, rather than departing from, what has come before.
74These latter terms more often carry metaphysical \weight" in Greek philosophy, and
indeed are often described as honorics.
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feature) as opposed to becoming (or becoming some feature):
...Really, from their motion and changes and blending with each
other, everything becomes that we say is, when we're not speaking
correctly. For nothing ever is, but only becomes.75
This provides further reason not to take Socrates' characterization of percepti-
bles as onta as entailing that they are strictly being as opposed to becoming,
especially when they are, in the same passage, contrasted with ousia or ousiai.
As such, I do not nd that Phaedo 79a shows that a view of being and
becoming according to which those are two kinds of predication is so inconsistent
with metaphysical views that Plato would have more readily endorsed (if there
are such views). This is, of course, only one text among many. Considering
it in light of this material, however, might suggest that it is closer to being a
respectable bit of Platonic metaphysics than one might rst suspect it to be.
75Theaet. 152d. Compare Sextus Epiricus's note that he uses \it is" in place of \it appears."
(PH 1.135)
One might object that Socrates is here expounding a Protagorean theory to which neither
he nor Plato has any stable commitment. Even so, it suggests that Socrates at least nds
such a view intelligible.
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